Report No. SPO-2008-001

July 3, 2008

Inspector General

United States Department of Defense



Special Plans and Operations

Assessment of the Accountability of Arms and Ammunition Provided to the Security Forces of Iraq (U)

Classified by: Claude M. Kicklighter, Inspector General

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(U) Additional Information and Copies

The Department of Defense Office of Inspector General Assessment Team on Arms and Ammunition Accountability prepared this report. If you would like to obtain additional copies of this report or to suggest ideas for or to request future assessments, contact Assistant Inspector General Kenneth P. Moorefield at (703) 604 (DSN 664-1886) or

(703) 604 (DSN 664-10), (DSN 664-10).

Acronyms

AA&E Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives

BPC Baghdad Police College

CAATT Coalition Army Advisory Training Team

CEW Captured Enemy Weapons

DoDI DoD Instruction

DoDIG Department of Defense Inspector General

FMS Foreign Military Sales

FRAGO Fragmentary Order-a change to an Operations Order

GAO Government Accountability Office
ILDC Iraqi Logistics Development Committee
IRRF Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund

ISF Iraq Security Forces
ISFF Iraq Security Forces Fund
JMD Joint Manning Document

LMAT Logistics Management Advisory Team

MiTT Military Training Team
MNC-I Multi-National Corps-Iraq
MNF-I Multi-National Force-Iraq

MNSTC-I Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq

MoI Ministry of Interior MoD Ministry of Defense

NPTT National Police Transition Team

RFF Request for Forces

SAO Security Assistance Office SOP Standard Operating Procedures

SIGIR Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction

TACOM U.S. Army Tank, Automotive, and Life Cycle Management

Command

TND Taji National Depot USCENTCOM U.S. Central Command

USD(AT&L) Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology,

and Logistics

USD(I) Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence USD(P) Under Secretary of Defense for Policy



INSPECTOR GENERAL DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202-4704

July 3, 2008

MEMORANDUM FOR DISTRIBUTION (U)

SUBJECT: Report on the Assessment of the Accountability of Arms and Ammunition Provided to the Security Forces of Iraq (Report No. SPO-2008-001/Project No. D2007-D000IG-0239.000) (U)

- (U) We are providing this final report for your information and use. We performed this assessment in response to requests from the Secretary of Defense; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; and from Congress.
- (U) The follow-up to this assessment was conducted in Iraq from April 26 to May 17, 2008. We note that progress has been made on all of the "in-country" recommendations. The results of the follow-up assessment will be published in a separate report.
- (U) For purposes of this report, we request the following additional comments and information within 30 days of the report publication date:
 - (U) From the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence—a copy of the memorandum clarifying the applicability of DoDI 5000.64, DoDI 5100.75, and DoD 5200.8-R to accountability, control, and physical security of arms and ammunition. (See management comments to recommendation A.)
 - (U) From USCENTCOM—A copy of the formal guidance governing accountability and control of arms and ammunition throughout the CENTCOM area of responsibility until formal handover to Iraq Security Forces. (See management comments to recommendation B.1.)
 - (U) From the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy:
 - (U) Reconsideration of their nonconcurrence with recommendation M.1 (coordinated with the Army.) (See management comments and assessment response to recommendation M.1.)
 - (U) Reconsideration of their position on recommendation N.1 (coordinated with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and USCENTCOM). (See management comments and assessment response to recommendation N.1.)
 - (U) From the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics—reconsideration of their position on recommendation N.1



(coordinated with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and USCENTCOM). (See management comments and assessment response to recommendation N.1.)

(U) From MNF-I—A copy of the FRAGO implementing a Logistics Action Plan directing MNF-I and subordinate units to execute effectsbased tasks to increase the ISF logistics capability and capacity. (See management comments to recommendation N.2.c.)

(U) We appreciate the courtesies extended to the staff. Questions should be directed to Assistant Inspector General Kenneth P. Moorefield at (703) 604at (703) 604 (DSN @dodig.mil. See Appendix I for the report distribution.

Classified By: Claude M. Kicklighter, Inspector General

1.4(2)(0) Reason: Declassify On: July 3, 2018

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL (U)

Report No. SPO-2008-001

Project No. D2007-D000IG-0239.000 (U)

July 3, 2008

Assessment of the Accountability of Arms and Ammunition Provided to the Security Forces of Iraq (U)

Executive Summary (U)

Background (U)

- (U) DoD Office of Inspector General (OIG) efforts regarding the accountability and control of U.S.-purchased arms and ammunition provided to the Iraq Security Forces (ISF) was triggered by a December 2005 DoD Hotline complaint and other information that a senior U.S. Army officer received illegal gratuities from a DoD contractor. This has evolved into extensive and ongoing DoD criminal investigations involving millions of dollars in bribes and a number of U.S. military officers, noncommissioned officers, civilian officials, and DoD contractors.
- (U) Initiation of the Assessment. While investigating these complaints, investigators from the OIG Defense Criminal Investigative Service and the U.S. Army Criminal Investigative Division raised further concerns about the accountability, control, and loss of weapons provided to the ISF by the U.S. Government. These concerns were reinforced by a Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction audit report, followed by a Government Accountability Office audit report, which indicated accountability and control problems with particular weapons provided to the ISF in Iraq. Appendix B provides a discussion of these reports.
- (U) In December 2006 and January 2007 the DoD OIG received allegations from the Turkish National Police and Ministry of Defense that weapons and explosives the U.S. supplied to the ISF were finding their way into the hands of insurgents, terrorists, and criminals in Turkey.
- (U) After being briefed on that situation, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and congressional leadership requested that the DoD Inspector General send a team to review the current accountability and control over arms and ammunition provided to the ISF. The DoD Inspector General organized and deployed an Assessment Team to address the issue and review arms and ammunition accountability. Appendix C provides definitions of terms

used in this report. Appendix D lists organizations contacted and visited.

- (U) Assessment Team Actions. As the Assessment Team redeployed from Iraq in October 2007, the Inspector General out-briefed the preliminary observations and recommendations to the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq; the Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I); the Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I); and, by video teleconference, the Deputy Commander and key staff members at U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM).
- (U) On the basis of our preliminary recommendations, these commands initiated a number of immediate corrective actions. A written status report on the preliminary recommendations that identified those corrective actions was submitted to the Inspector General by the Deputy Commander, USCENTCOM, on December 7, 2007. Input from the status report was considered in the development of the draft report that went out for formal management comments.
- (U) That report indicated that USCENTCOM and its subordinate field commands had taken constructive and aggressive action to address the spectrum of our observations and recommendations. Those initiatives included addressing many of the issues we reported on policies and procedures, personnel resources and infrastructure, U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS), and ISF logistics capabilities. Where applicable, we have noted, throughout this report, those actions taken by USCENTCOM in response to our preliminary recommendations.

Objectives (U)

- (U) The announced overall objective of the assessment team on arms and ammunition accountability was to determine whether the controls over the distribution of conventional military arms, ammunition, and explosives provided to the security forces of Iraq were adequate.
- (U) Subsequently, the team revised its objectives for Iraq to determine whether:
 - (U) DoD currently had adequate accountability and control over U.S.purchased and otherwise obtained arms and ammunition under its control before formal handover to ISF; and
 - (U) Whether ISF currently had adequate accountability and controls over U.S.-purchased and otherwise obtained arms and ammunition under its control after receiving them from DoD.
- (U) After the team arrived in Iraq, it began an examination of two additional but related issues:
 - (U) The effectiveness of the FMS program; and
 - (U) The current status of the development of the Iraqi logistics sustainment base.
- (U) Both of those issues are extremely important to the ability of the U.S. and

¹ Arms and ammunition captured, seized, donated, turned-in, and obtained through existing U.S. stocks.

ISF to improve accountability and control of arms and ammunition and are key to an independent ISF.

Scope (U)

- (U) We examined accountability and control policies and procedures for arms and ammunition in Iraq that were in place at the time of our assessment. The scope of our assessment in Iraq applied to two areas:
 - 1. (U) U.S.-purchased and otherwise obtained arms and ammunition that were under DoD control before DoD formally transferred them to the ISF. Specifically, we reviewed accountability and control of arms and ammunition from the time of arrival at selected Iraq ports of entry until the formal handover to ISF.
 - 2. (U) U.S.-purchased and otherwise obtained arms and ammunition that were under ISF control after DoD formally transferred them to ISF. Specifically, we reviewed arms and ammunition from the time of formal handover to ISF by DoD organizations through the subsequent issuance to selected Iraqi military and police units.

Arms and Ammunition Assessment Team Chronology (U)

(U) June – July 2007	Briefed DoD and Department of State leadership and Congressional Committees
(U) July 2007	DoD Arms and Ammunition Assessment Team established
(U) September – October 2007	Trip to Kuwait, Afghanistan, and Iraq
(U) November 2007	Briefed the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
(U) December 2007	Briefed Congressional Committees
(U) December 2007- March 2008	Report writing
(U) March 2008	Draft assessment report issued
(U) April 2008	Management comments received and evaluated
(U) April – May 2008	DoD Arms and Ammunition Assessment Team Follow-up Trip to Iraq

Arms and Ammunition Accountability and Control – What is Working (U)

- (U) The DoD has made and continues to make improvements in accountability and control over arms and ammunition being supplied to ISF; however, there is still work to be done.
 - (U) MNF-I and its subordinate command, MNSTC-I, began implementing a weapons serialization program in 2006 that accounted for weapons being purchased for and supplied to ISF through the train-and-equip mission.
 - (U) MNSTC-I initiated joint inventories of arms and ammunition between U.S forces and ISF at Taji National Depot (the Iraqi national military arms and ammunition depot) and Baghdad Police College (the Iraqi national police arms and ammunition depot).
 - (U) U.S. forces transferred responsibility and oversight of equipment and arms and ammunition to ISF by assisting the Iraqi Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the Iraqi Ministry of Interior (MoI) in opening their national, regional, and provincial warehouses for arms and ammunition storage.
- (U) The ISF has efforts underway to establish more effective accountability and control for arms and ammunition. Progress is being made, but improvements must continue.
 - (U) The Iraqi Army has established a system of property books, by serial number, which includes all weapons issued to its soldiers. As of October 2007, the system was estimated to be 85 percent complete, down to the company level. The Iraqi Army's goal is 100 percent.
 - (U) The Iraqi Army was issuing U.S.-supplied M16A4 and M4 rifles to individual soldiers by serial number and using biometric technology, including fingerprints, photographs, and iris scans.
 - (U) Since January 2007, the MoI has maintained a centralized database of serial numbers for weapons in the police force inventory and has recorded all serial numbers of weapons coming into Baghdad Police College (BPC), as well as those subsequently issued from BPC to police units.
 - (U) The MoI is recording serial numbers of weapons previously issued to the police, with the goal of having the inventory 75 percent complete by the end of 2007.

Arms and Ammunition Accountability and Control – What Issues Need to be Addressed (U)

Part I - DoD and Iraq Security Forces Policy and Procedures: Observations and Recommendations² (U)

- (U) Observation A. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD[AT&L]) and the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD[I]) had not clarified the applicability of existing DoD policy regarding accountability and control of U.S.-supplied arms and ammunition to ISF.
- (U) Recommendation for Observation A. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence should issue a letter to clarify that Department of Defense Instruction 5000.64 governs the accountability and control and Department of Defense Instruction 5100.76 governs the physical security of arms, ammunition, and explosives under U.S. control from the point of entry into the United States Central Command area of responsibility until formal handover to Iraq Security Forces or, as appropriate, to other Coalition partners within the United States Central Command area of responsibility.

(U) Observation B.

- (U) USCENTCOM, MNF-I, Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I), and MNSTC-I had not issued written guidance for the accountability and control of arms and ammunition delivered to or transported through the USCENTCOM area of responsibility and subsequently provided to ISF or Coalition partners.
- (U) MNF-I had not issued a uniform policy to coordinate the efforts of MNC-I and MNSTC-I for the accountability and control of arms and ammunition delivered to or transported through Iraq.

(U) Recommendations for Observation B.

(U) United States Central Command should issue formal procedures governing the accountability and control of arms and ammunition under U.S. control from the point of entry into and transport through the United States Central Command area of responsibility until formal handover to Iraq Security Forces or, as appropriate, to other Coalition partners within the United States Central Command area of responsibility.

Unless noted under a specific recommendation in the Executive Summary, management concurred with the recommendations. Detailed management comments are provided in the body of the report and the full version of the comments are in Appendix E.

- (U) Multi-National Force-Iraq should issue formal procedures to govern and coordinate the efforts of its subordinate organizations to account for and control arms and ammunition under U.S. control from the point of entry into and transport through Iraq until formal handover to Iraq Security Forces or, as appropriate, to other Coalition partners in Iraq.
- (U) Observation C. MNF-I had not clearly defined procedures for the accountability, control, and final disposition of weapons captured by U.S. forces, to include recording captured weapons serial numbers, and had not issued uniform procedures to coordinate the efforts of MNC-I and MNSTC-I for the captured weapons.
- (U) Recommendation for Observation C. Multi-National Force-Iraq should issue formal procedures to govern the accountability, control, and final disposition of weapons captured by U.S. forces and to coordinate the efforts of Multi-National Corps-Iraq and Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq in processing weapons captured by U.S. forces.
- (U) Observation D. MNF-I had not issued procedures on the missions, roles, and responsibilities applicable to U.S. and Coalition transition teams and senior advisors involved in advising and assisting MoD, MoI, and subordinate ISF organizations or to coordinate the efforts of MNC-I and MNSTC-I transition teams to support the ISF in its efforts to account for and control U.S.-supplied or Iraqi-procured arms and ammunition.
- (U) Recommendation for Observation D. Multi-National Force-Iraq should issue formal procedures on the missions, roles, and responsibilities applicable to U.S. and Coalition transition teams and senior advisors involved in advising and assisting the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Interior, and subordinate Iraq Security Forces organizations and to coordinate the efforts of Multi-National Corps-Iraq and Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq transition teams to support the Iraqi Security forces in its efforts to account for and control U.S.-supplied or Iraqi-procured arms and ammunition.
- (U) Observation E. MoD and MoI had not issued written policies and procedures for military and police national arms and ammunition depots and other storage facilities (such as provincial, regional, unit, or station levels) for the accountability and control of U.S.-supplied or Iraqi-procured arms and ammunition.
- (U) Recommendation for Observation E. Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq should advise and assist the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior in the preparation and promulgation of formal policies and procedures for military and police national arms and ammunition depots and other storage facilities that address the accountability and control of U.S.-supplied or Iraqi-procured arms and ammunition.
- (U) Observation F. MoD and MoI had not issued written policies and procedures for the accountability, control, processing, and disposition of weapons captured by ISF or Coalition forces, to include weapons captured by U.S. forces that are subsequently turned over to ISF.
- (U) Recommendation for Observation F. Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq should advise and assist the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of


Interior in the preparation and promulgation of formal policies and procedures for the accountability, control, processing, and final disposition of weapons the Iraq Security Forces captures or weapons captured and turned over to the Iraq Security Forces by Coalition forces.

Part II - DoD and Iraq Security Forces Operations: Observations and Recommendations (U)

(U) Observation G.

- (U) U.S. forces did not always maintain an unbroken chain of custody for the accountability and control of U.S- controlled arms and ammunition before formal handover to ISF.
- (U) U.S. arms and ammunition were placed temporarily in areas that lacked sufficient physical security to prevent misplacement, loss, or theft or sufficient storage capacity to efficiently process high-volume deliveries of arms and ammunition shipments.
- (U) U.S. forces and ISF did not always perform joint inventories of U.S.-controlled weapons prior to formal handover to ISF, and serial numbers for weapons were not always recorded.
- (U) Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan contracts for the procurement of weapons did not always contain clauses requiring lists of weapons serial numbers be sent in advance of weapons shipments to Iraq, the delivery of arms and ammunition to Iraq through U.S.-controlled ports of entry within Iraq, or that shippers provide enroute visibility, to include the arrival dates and times of arms and ammunition cargo being delivered to Iraq.

(U) Recommendations for Observation G.



- (U) Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq, with advice and assistance from the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior, should jointly develop formal procedures for the delivery, joint inventory, and formal handover of U.S.-controlled arms and ammunition delivered to Iraq Security Forces.
- (U) Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan should review all contracts issued to procure and deliver arms and ammunition to ensure that clauses are included that require vendors and shippers to:


- (U) Deliver arms and ammunition to Iraq through U.S.-controlled ports of entry within Iraq;
- (U) Provide serial number lists electronically in advance of any weapons shipments to Iraq;
- (U) Post serial number lists on the inside and outside of weapons shipping containers: and
- (U) Provide enroute visibility to include the arrival dates and times of arms and ammunition cargo being delivered to Iraq.
- (U) Observation H. The process to populate the MNSTC-I centralized database of weapons serial numbers for weapons issued to ISF by U.S. forces lacked internal data input controls.
- (U) Recommendation for Observation H. Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq should install data input quality controls in its centralized database of weapons serial numbers using a trained database programmer, and U.S. Army Materiel Command Logistics Support Activity should assist Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq with installing data input quality controls in its centralized database to ensure system compatibility.

(U) Observation I.

- (U) The physical count of three types of Iraqi military weapons maintained at Taji National Depot (TND) did not match the numbers of weapons recorded in the inventory database. In addition, the team was unable to locate all of the three types of weapons in TND because of the disorganized manner in which the weapons were physically stored.
- (U) The BPC did not have sufficient storage capacity for the anticipated volume of arms and ammunition shipments procured through the Iraq Security Forces Fund and FMS.

(U) Recommendations for Observation I.

- (U) Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq should advise and assist the Ministry of Defense in performing a 100 percent inventory to establish a baseline for Iraqi military weapons and ammunition stored at Taji National Depot. Thereafter, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq should advise and assist the Ministry of Defense in performing a 10 percent inventory of Iraqi military weapons and ammunition on a monthly basis.
- (U) Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq should advise and assist the Ministry of Defense in establishing effective warehouse management and organization processes at Taji National Depot for storing weapons and ammunition and requesting help from U.S.-based logistics organizations as needed.
- (U) Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq should advise and assist the Ministry of Interior to construct sufficient capacity for arms and ammunition storage at Baghdad Police College and other sites as necessary for the anticipated volume of arms and ammunition shipments.



(U) Observation K.

- (U) Data gathered from U.S. military transition teams supporting four Iraqi Divisions on the accountability of arms and ammunition indicated that approximately 85 percent of the Iraqi Army units in those divisions were accounting for weapons by serial number, with plans to increase to 100 percent. Further, the MoI started recording serial numbers of weapons issued to police forces in January 2007.
- (U) Although the MoI has begun to develop a centralized database to record serial numbers of MoI weapons, we found no indication of a similar effort underway in the MoD.

(U) Recommendations for Observation K.

- (U) Multi-National Force-Iraq should advise and assist the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Interior, and their subordinate military and police organizations in attaining and maintaining 100 percent accountability and control of Iraq Security Forces' weapons by serial numbers.
- (U) Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq should instruct all U.S. and Coalition military transition teams to assist/mentor the appropriate Iraqi personnel in the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior in development of their own centralized database of weapons' serial numbers.
- (U) Management Comment. MNF-I nonconcurred with this recommendation as it was initially written, stating it gave the impression that MNSTC-I should register all Iraqi weapons in the MNSTC-I weapons serial number database. On the basis of the MNF-I management comments, we modified the recommendation as currently written above, encouraging the MoD and MoI to develop their own weapons serial number databases.


Part III - DoD Personnel Resources: Observations and Recommendations (U)

(U) Observation L. The MNSTC-I J4 (logistics function) did not have sufficient personnel, and those they had did not have the requisite skills and experience levels, to carry out its mission (including arms and ammunition oversight). Further, MNSTC-I program oversight was hindered because the command did not have an Inspector General and had only one internal audit liaison officer.

(U) Recommendations for Observation L.

- (U) Multi-National Force-Iraq should approve a Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq Joint Manning Document that provides for sufficient numbers of personnel to successfully execute its logistics mission and establish and staff an Office of the Inspector General and an Office of Internal Review.
- (U) United States Central Command and the Joint Staff should expeditiously approve the proposed Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq Joint Manning Document and expedite the assignment of personnel to fill positions designated in Joint Manning Document.

Part IV – U.S. Foreign Military Sales: Observations and Recommendations (U)



(U) Recommendations for Observation M.

- (U) The Secretary of Defense should appoint a Department of Defense Executive Agent for the Iraqi Foreign Military Sales program. Consideration should be given to designating the Secretary of the Army as the Executive Agent. The Executive Agent will activate a Joint Program Management Office that will focus full-time on support for ISF, seven days per week to:
 - Integrate, expedite, coordinate and drive the Iraqi Foreign Military Sales program in the United States, increase the responsiveness of the support effort for the U.S. commanders, and meet the wartime requirements of the Iraq Security forces. This is an operational, not a policy, office or another bureaucratic layer. The office's only mission is to ensure the support in the security assistance area is provided to U.S. Central Command, Multi-National Force-Iraq and Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq.

Ensure U.S. Central Command, Multi-National Force-Iraq, Multi-National Corps-Iraq and Multi-National Security Transition
 Command-Iraq have the support needed, as required and on-time, to better assist MoD and MoI to build combat ready military and police forces.

(U) Management Comments.

- (U) The Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) (USD[P]) nonconcurred, noting that an Executive Agent for FMS already exists—the Defense Security Cooperation Agency. Furthermore, establishment of a formal Joint Program Management Office for the Iraq FMS program would create unneeded bureaucracy and is not necessary in view of actions already taken to improve the responsiveness of the Iraq FMS program. Moreover, establishment of a U.S.-based Joint Program Management Office to implement integration/coordination of a country's FMS program would, in general, need to be requested by the government of that country and funded by it.
- (U) The Secretary of the Army also nonconcurred, noting that the Defense Technology Security Administration was already performing the function of the proposed Joint Program Management Office. The Secretary of the Army also noted that the Army had diverted thousands of items from inventory and accelerated delivery of numerous commodities.
- (U) Assessment Response. We did not modify the recommendation. On the basis of our assessment of the management comments, we continue to believe appointing an Executive Agent is the preferred option.
- (U) The USD(P) comments noted that an executive agent for FMS already exists. However, DoDD 5106.65 established DSCA as an agency of DoD, not as an "executive agent" of FMS. The Directive further states that the Director, DSCA, shall be appointed by USD(P). DoDD 5101.1 states that only SECDEF or DEPSECDEF may designate a DoD Executive Agent. Since the Director, DSCA is appointed by USD(P), rather than by SECDEF or DEPSECDEF; the Director, DSCA is not an executive agent until and unless so designated by SECDEF or DEPSECDEF.
- (U) We also see the Joint Program Management Office as an operational office, vice a policy office. The mission of this office is to solve problems and eliminate bottlenecks.
- (U) We ask that USD(P), in coordination with the Army, reconsider their position on Recommendation M.1 and provide additional comments or options within 30 days of the report publication date.

Recommendations for Observation M (continued).

(U) The Secretary of Defense, with appropriate congressional approval, should establish a Defense Coalition Support Account to acquire a pool of high priority, high demand, urgently needed equipment that will be immediately available for shipment to the Iraqi Security Forces to expand forces, modernize forces, and replace combat losses.

- (U) Multi-National Force-Iraq should establish and approve authorized positions for its security assistance office in the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq Joint Manning Document that provides sufficient personnel with the requisite skills and experience levels to successfully execute its security assistance mission.
- (U) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and United States Central Command should expedite:
 - (U) Approval of the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq Joint Manning Document; and
 - (U) Assignment of personnel with the requisite skills, experience levels, and rank to fill positions designated in the Joint Manning Document.
- (U) Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq should advise and assist the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior in establishing a requirements planning process that forecasts the Iraq Security Forces' equipment and training needs on a multi-year basis to stabilize and improve the responsiveness of the Iraq Foreign Military Sales program.

Part V – Iraq Security Forces Logistics Capabilities: Observations and Recommendations (U)

(U) Observation N.

- (U) The ISF logistics system was in the early stages of development; the system was fragile and not capable of totally sustaining independent ISF military operations. MNSTC-I and MNC-I do not have sufficient personnel with the requisite skills and experience levels to carry out their logistics mentoring mission and assist ISF in establishing its logistical sustainment base. Establishing this sustainment capability is a U.S. and Iraqi top priority.
- (U) The expeditious approval of the proposed MNSTC-I JMD/Request for Forces and the assignment of personnel with the requisite skills, experience levels, and rank to fill positions for the logistics mentoring functions will greatly enhance ISF efforts to become self sufficient and increasingly take over battle space. This result will greatly reduce the demands on Coalition forces.

(U) Recommendations for Observation N.

(U) The Secretary of Defense should appoint a Department of Defense Executive Agent to integrate, coordinate, and expedite the support needed by the U.S. Central Command, the Multi-National Force-Iraq, the Multi-National Corps-Iraq, and the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq as they advise and assist the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior in planning and building their logistics sustainment base for the Iraq Security Forces. The

Executive Agent would drive the support needed from the United States to support the U.S. Commanders as they assist the Iraq Security Forces build their ability to conduct totally independent operations and expand their battle space.

(U) Management Comments.

(U) USD(P) and USD(AT&L) concurred with the importance of developing the ISF logistics capabilities, agreeing to explore options and mechanisms to assist the government of Iraq in that effort. However, they did not explicitly support or reject the "Executive Agent" proposal, which was part of our recommendation.

(U) Assessment Response.

- (U) On the basis of the management comments and our assessment of those comments, we continue to believe appointing a DoD Executive Agent is the preferred option to ensure USCENTCOM, MNF-I, MNC-I, and MNSTC-I have the support needed to assist ISF build their capacity to fully support combat operations. MNF-I, MNC-I, and MNSTC-I must have quick reach back capability, through USCENTCOM, to a single operational point of contact so that timely support will be provided to USCENTCOM and MNF-I related to developing ISF logistics capacity. This DoD Executive Agent must be available twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week and have this as the only mission.
- (U) Because we believe that the success of the logistics sustainment program for Iraq is so critical and the USD(P) and USD(AT&L) response did not clearly indicate concurrence or nonconcurrence with the Executive Agent proposal, we recommend that senior management reconsider the proposal to establish an Executive Agent to drive this program, focusing on the areas that need improvement.
- (U) If USD(P) and USD(AT&L) disagree with recommendation N.1, we ask that they develop and provide options other than appointing an Executive Agent, as they committed to in their response. We request that they coordinate these options with USCENTCOM. We also request this information within 30 days so that we can evaluate the options independently.

Recommendations for Observation N (continued).

- (U) Multi-National Force-Iraq should:
 - (U) Establish and approve the required positions for senior logistics mentors and military and police transition team logistics mentors in the Multi-National Corps-Iraq and the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq through the Joint Manning Document or Request for Forces processes so as to provide sufficient personnel with the requisite skills and experience levels to successfully execute the logistics mentoring mission.
 - (U) Ensure that senior logistics mentors and military transition team logistics mentors assigned to Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq via the Joint Manning

- (U) Establish a logistics training program in Iraq, comparable in comprehensiveness to that currently provided by the Counter-Insurgency Academy, to train U.S. military and police transition team logistics mentors. This could be a block of instruction taught at the Counter Insurgency Academy itself. We need to ensure that logistics mentors/advisors are prepared to perform this critical mission.
- (U) Management Comments. MNF-I nonconcurred with recommendation to establish a logistics training program in Iraq, comparable to the Counter-Insurgency Academy. The MNF-I CG established an Iraqi Logistics Development Committee (ILDC), an initiatives group to develop a way ahead to assist the accelerated growth of the ISF life support, maintenance, and logistics system. In late March 2008, the initiatives group provided a decision brief to the Commander, MNC-I and Commander, MNSTC-I. MNF-I planned to publish a FRAGO in late May 2008 that will provide a Logistics Action Plan directing MNF-I and subordinate units to execute effects-based tasks to increase the ISF logistics capability and capacity.
- (U) Assessment Response. We did not modify the recommendation. Our recommendation was a request to insure the logistics trainers and mentors were properly trained for the mission they were assigned. We found some very dedicated trainers and mentors that were not properly prepared for the job they were given. In response to the final report, we ask that MNF-I provide us with a copy of the MNF-I FRAGO that will implement the Logistics Action Plan, as developed by the ILDC OPT. We will review this document to determine if meets the intent this recommendation.

Recommendations for Observation N (continued).

- (U) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and United States Central Command should expedite:
 - (U) Approval of the Multi-National Corps-Iraq and Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq Joint Manning Document/Request for Forces;
 - (U) A request for the necessary funding; and
 - (U) Assignment of personnel with the requisite skills, experience levels, and rank, to include civilians from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, to fill positions designated in the Joint Manning Document/Request for Forces for the Multi-National Corps-Iraq and Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq logistics mentoring functions.
- (U) Assessment Follow-Up. The follow-up to this assessment was conducted in Iraq from April 26 to May 17, 2008. We note that progress has been made on all of the "in country" recommendations. The results of that follow-up assessment will be published in a separate report.

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Background (U)

- (U) DoD Office of Inspector General (OIG) efforts regarding the accountability³ and control of U.S.-purchased arms and ammunition⁴ provided to the Iraq Security Forces (ISF) was triggered by a December 2005 DoD Hotline complaint and other allegations alleging that a senior U.S. Army officer received illegal gratuities from a DoD contractor. This has evolved into extensive and ongoing DoD criminal investigations, involving millions of dollars in bribes and a number of U.S. military officers, noncommissioned officers, civilian officials, and DoD contractors.
- (U) Initiation of the Assessment. While investigating these complaints, investigators from the OIG Defense Criminal Investigative Service and the U.S. Army Criminal Investigative Division raised further concerns about the accountability, control, and loss of weapons provided to the ISF by the United States. Those concerns were reinforced by the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction and Government Accountability Office audit reports that indicated accountability and control problems with particular weapons provided to ISF. Appendix B provides a discussion of those audit reports.
- (U) In December 2006 and January 2007 the DoD OIG received allegations from the Turkish National Police and Ministry of Defense that weapons and explosives the U.S. was supplying to the ISF were finding their way into the hands of insurgents, terrorists, and criminals in Turkey.
- (U) The Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and congressional leadership requested that the DoD Inspector General (DoDIG) send a team to review the current accountability and control over arms and ammunition provided to ISF. The Inspector General organized an assessment team on arms and ammunition accountability to address the issue.
- (U) Assessment Team Actions. As the DoDIG assessment team redeployed from Iraq in October 2007, the Inspector General out-briefed the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq; the Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I); the Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) and, by video teleconference, the Deputy Commander, U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) on the preliminary observations and recommendations.
- (U) On the basis of our preliminary recommendations, the military commands initiated a number of corrective actions. A written status report that identified those corrective actions was submitted to the DoDIG by the Deputy Commander, USCENTCOM, on December 7, 2007.
- (U) The USCENTCOM report indicated that the field commands had already taken constructive and expeditious actions to address the spectrum of our

³ Accountability is defined in Appendix C.

⁴ Arms and ammunition is defined in Appendix C.

observations and recommendations, which included addressing many of the issues we raised on policies and procedures, personnel resources and infrastructure, U.S. Foreign Military Sales⁵ (FMS), and ISF logistics⁶ sustainment capabilities. Where applicable, we have noted those actions taken by USCENTCOM throughout this report.

- (U) Public Laws. Congress provided more than \$18.6 billion through Public Law 108-106, as amended, to remain available until September 30, 2006, to the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF). IRRF was to be used for the security, relief, rehabilitation, and reconstruction of Iraq. Some of these funds were allocated for the procurement of arms and ammunition for ISF.
- (U) Congress also provided more than \$15.4 billion to the Iraq Security Forces Fund (ISFF) through Public Laws 109-13, 109-234, 109-289, 110-28, and 110-161. Some of these funds were allocated for the procurement of arms and ammunition for ISF.
- (U) National Priorities. National priorities concerning Iraq are discussed in the National Security Council's "National Strategy for Victory in Iraq," November 2005, and in charts describing the highlights of the National Security Council's "Iraq Strategy Review," January 2007.
- (U) The "National Strategy for Victory in Iraq," states in its Strategic Pillar Two, "Transition Iraq to Security Self-Reliance," that the strategic objective is "The Government of Iraq provides for the internal security of Iraq, monitors and controls its borders, successfully defends against terrorists and other security threats." The document states that the U.S. is helping Iraq achieve this objective by pursuing lines of action such as:

Helping to train and equip the Iraq Security Forces, military, and police, so they can combat terrorist and other enemy activity and maintain a secure environment in Iraq.

Assisting in the development of Iraq's security ministries to control, manage, and sustain the Iraq Security Forces and assume greater responsibility for the security of the state.

- (U) The "Iraq Strategy Review," states that "while our strategic goal requires a long-term relationship with Iraq, we are at a new phase in the effort and must sharpen the objectives we believe are achievable in the next 12-18 months." One of the objectives in this new phase is to "continue to strengthen Iraq Security Forces and accelerate the transition of security responsibility to the Iraqi Government."
- (U) Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq. Specific performance indicators and measures of progress toward political, economic, and security stability in Iraq

⁵ Foreign Military Sales is defined in Appendix C.

⁶ Logistics is defined in Appendix C.

are provided in a DoD report made to Congress quarterly, "Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq," as required by Public Law 109-289, section 9010 (as amended by section 1308 of Public Law 110-28), "Department of Defense Appropriations Act for 2007." The two most recent reports were issued September 14, 2007, and December 14, 2007. The reports complement other reports and information about Iraq provided to Congress and are not intended as a single source of all information about the combined efforts or the future strategy of the United States, its Coalition partners, or Iraq.

- (U) Train and Equip Mission. Public Laws 109-13, 109-234, 109-289, and 110-28 define the train and equip mission. Those laws provided ISFF funds to be used to provide funding; equipment; supplies; services; training; facility and infrastructure repair, renovation, and construction for the security forces of Iraq.
- (U) Organizations Involved in the Train and Equip Mission. Organizations involved in the train and equip mission are discussed in Appendix F.
- (U) Arms and Ammunition. Arms and ammunition for ISF may be obtained through various methods and sources, which are discussed in Appendix G.

Objectives (U)

- (U) The announced overall objective of this assessment was to determine whether the controls over the distribution of conventional military arms, ammunition, and explosives provided to the security forces of Iraq and Afghanistan were adequate. Subsequently, we revised the objectives for Iraq to:
 - (U) Determine whether DoD currently had adequate accountability and controls over U.S.-purchased and otherwise obtained arms and ammunition under its control before DoD formal handover to ISF, and
 - (U) Determine whether ISF currently had adequate accountability and controls over U.S.-purchased and otherwise obtained arms and ammunition under its control after DoD formal handover to ISF.
- (U) After our arrival in Iraq, we examined two additional but related issues: implementing the FMS program and building the Iraq logistics sustainment base. For scope and methodology related to the objectives, see Appendix A. For a summary of prior coverage related to the objectives, see Appendix B. Appendix C provides definitions of terms used in this report.

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Part I (U)

DoD and Iraq Security Forces Policy and Procedures (U)

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Observation A.

DoD Policy for the Accountability and Control of Arms and Ammunition in Iraq (U)

(U) The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD[AT&L]) and the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD[I]) had not clarified the applicability of existing DoD policy regarding accountability and control of U.S.-supplied arms and ammunition to ISF.

Applicable Criteria (U)

- (U) Title 40 United State Code. Title 40 United States Code (U.S.C.), section 524 states:
- (a) Required. - Each executive agency shall--(1) maintain adequate inventory controls and accountability systems for property under its control.
- (U) DoD Instructions. DoD Instructions (DoDI) that apply to accountability and control of arms and ammunition are as follows:
 - DoDI 5000.64, "Accountability and Management of DoD-Owned Equipment and Other Accountable Property," November 2, 2006.
 - DoDI 5100.76, "Safeguarding Conventional Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives (AA&E) and the AA&E Physical Security Review Board," October 8, 2005; and related guidance cited in those Instructions apply to the accountability, control, and physical security of AA&E and other designated sensitive items in possession or custody of DoD components while awaiting transfer to ISF.
 - DoD 5200.8-R, "Physical Security Program," outlines the minimum physical security standards to properly safeguard arms, ammunition, and explosives (AA&E) against loss.
- (U) Public Law 110-181. In addition, Public Law 110-181, the "National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008," section 1228, "Tracking and Monitoring of Defense Articles Provided to the Government of Iraq and Other Individuals and Groups in Iraq," January 28, 2008, states:
 - (a) Export and Transfer Control Policy The President shall implement a policy to control the export and transfer of defense articles⁷ into Iraq, including implementation of the registration and monitoring system under subsection (c).

⁷ Defense articles are defined in Appendix C.

- (b) Requirement to Implement Control System No defense articles may be provided to the Government of Iraq or any other group, organization, citizen, or resident of Iraq until the President certifies to the specified congressional committees that a registration and monitoring system meeting the requirements in subsection (c) has been established.
- (c) Registration and Monitoring System The registration and monitoring system required under this subsection shall include –
- (1) the registration of the serial numbers of all small arms⁸ to be provided to the Government of Iraq or to other groups, organizations, citizens, or residents of Iraq;
- (2) a program of end-use monitoring of all lethal defense articles provided to such entities or individuals; and
- (3) a detailed record of the origin, shipping, and distribution of all defense articles transferred under the Iraq Security Forces Fund or any other security assistance program to such entities or individuals.
- (U) Although that legislation does not take effect until July 2008, we believe that the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD[AT&L]) and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD[P])should consider the requirements of this particular act in implementing the recommendations in this report. Other applicable guidance is discussed in Appendix H.

Recommendations (U)

- (U) A. We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence issue a letter to clarify that Department of Defense Instruction 5000.64 governs the accountability and control and Department of Defense Instruction 5100.76 governs the physical security of arms, ammunition, and explosives under U.S. control from the point of entry into the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility until formal handover to the Iraq Security Forces or as appropriate to other Coalition partners within the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility.
- (U) Management Comments to Recommendation A. USD(AT&L), USD(I), and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD[P]) concurred with this recommendation. They stated that the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)

⁸ For the purposes of this legislation, small arms are defined as handguns, shoulder-fired weapons, light automatic weapons up to and including .50 caliber machine guns, recoilless rifles up to and including 106mm, mortars up to and including 81mm, rocket launchers that are man portable, grenade launchers that are rifle and shoulder fired, and individually operated weapons which are portable or can be fired without special mounts or firing devices and which have potential use in civil disturbances and are vulnerable to theft.

will issue a memorandum clarifying the applicability of DoDI 5000.64 and DoD I 5100.75 and will also reiterate the provisions of DoD 5200.8-R,"Physical Security Program."

(U) Assessment Response. The management comments meet the intent of Recommendation A.

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Observation B.

DoD Component Procedures for the Accountability and Control of Arms and Ammunition in the U.S. Central Command Area of Responsibility (U)

- (U) USCENTCOM, MNF-I and its subordinate commands had not clearly defined the procedures for the accountability and control of U.S.-supplied arms and ammunition to ISF.
- (U) Specifically, USCENTCOM, MNF-I, Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I), and MNSTC-I had not issued written procedures for the accountability and control of arms and ammunition delivered to or transported through the USCENTCOM area of responsibility and subsequently provided to ISF or Coalition partners.
- (U) In addition, MNF-I had not issued written procedures to coordinate the efforts of MNC-I and MNSTC-I for the accountability and control of arms and ammunition delivered to or transported through Iraq.

Applicable Criteria (U)

- (U) Title 40 United State Code. Title 40 U.S.C., section 524 states:
- (a) Required. - Each executive agency shall (1) maintain adequate inventory controls and accountability systems for property under its control.
- (U) **DoD Instruction 5000.64.** DoDI 5000.64 provides policy and procedures for DoD-owned equipment and other accountable property and establishes policy and procedures to comply with 40 U.S.C. § 524. DoDI 5000.64 requires that accountable property records shall be established for all property purchased, or otherwise obtained, that are sensitive as defined in DoD 4100.39-M, "Federal Logistics Information System," volume 10, Table 61, November 2007.
- (U) **DoD 4000.25-2-M.** DoD 4000.25-2-M, "Military Standard Transaction Reporting and Accounting Procedures," chapter 12, January 2006, discusses the responsibilities of DoD Components for inventory management of small arms and the use of the DoD Registry. The U.S. Army Materiel Command Logistics Support Activity serves as repository for small arms serial numbers provided by the other DoD component registries as part of the DoD Small Arms Serialization Program.

⁹ The DoD Small Arms Serialization Program is defined and discussed in Appendix C.

Procedures (U)

- (U) Procedures and orders should be finalized and formalized to provide official guidance. The guidance should be issued in writing by a formal memorandum or fragmentary order that specifies the procedures requiring compliance, and contains the name(s), title(s), signature(s), and date(s) showing the approval of authorized official(s), as applicable. Documents that must be used by Government of Iraq personnel should be translated into the applicable local language.
- (U) We also believe that procedures and orders issued within the USCENTCOM area of responsibility should govern the delivery of arms and ammunition purchased through the ISFF, through FMS programs, or other U.S. funding sources. They should also apply to arms and ammunition obtained through capture, seizure, or donation.

Recommendations (U)

- (U) B.1. We recommend that the Commander, U.S. Central Command issue formal procedures governing the accountability and control of arms and ammunition under U.S. control from the point of entry into and transport through the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility until formal handover to the Iraq Security Forces or as appropriate to other Coalition partners within the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility.
- (U) Management Comments to Recommendation B.1. USCENTCOM concurred, noting that the Director of Logistics, USCENTCOM is drafting formal guidance, proposed for publication not later than July 2008.
- (U) Assessment Response. We will review USCENTCOM's formal guidance, when published, to determine if it meets the intent of the Recommendation B.1.
- (U) B.2. We recommend that the Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq, issue formal procedures:
- (U) a. Governing the accountability and control of arms and ammunition under U.S. control from the point of entry into and transport through Iraq until formal handover to the Iraq Security Forces or as appropriate to other Coalition partners in Iraq.
- (U) b. Coordinating the efforts of the Multi-National Corps-Iraq; the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq; the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Gulf Region Division; and any other command component to provide accountability and control of arms and ammunition under U.S. control from the point of entry into and transport throughout Iraq until formal handover to the Iraq Security Forces or, as appropriate, to other Coalition partners in Iraq.
- (U) Management Comments to Recommendation B.2. MNF-I concurred,

noting that MNSTC-I is in the final stages of publishing a Logistics Accountability SOP. The SOP provides specific direction for accountability and control of sensitive items (including arms and ammunition) during: Port of Debarkation operations, intra-theatre distribution, and warehouse operations. The SOP was approved and released by the MNSTC-I Commanding General on April 26, 2008.

(U) Assessment Response: The MNF-I response did not meet the intent of the Recommendation B.2. in its entirety. The MNSTC-I Logistics Accountability SOP applies only to MNSTC-I personnel. Unless additional action was taken, the MNSTC-I Logistics SOP would have no impact on the actions of U.S and Coalition personnel assigned to MNC-I and other commands involved in the control and accountability of arms and ammunition being provided to the ISF. We discussed this issue with MNF-I and MNC-I during our follow-up assessment. On June 5, 2008, the MNF-I Chief of Staff issued a memo making the MNSTC-I Logistics SOP applicable to all MNC-I elements "in order to ensure consistent accountability standards across the supply chain in Iraq." This action met the intent of recommendation B.2.

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
Observation C.

Multi-National Force-Iraq Procedures for Captured Weapons (U)

(U) MNF-I had not clearly defined procedures for the accountability, control, and final disposition of weapons captured by U.S. forces, to include recording captured weapons serial numbers. In addition, MNF-I had not issued written procedures to coordinate the efforts of MNC-I and MNSTC-I for the accountability, control, and disposition of weapons captured by U.S. forces.

Visibility over Captured Weapons (U)

(U) We believe that procedures should govern inventory procedures for captured weapons, the recording of the weapons serial numbers, the control of captured weapons during processing, the disposition of weapons by the ISF, and the destruction of weapons that are unserviceable or otherwise unsuitable for military use. Figure 1. shows captured weapons stored in a container at Taji National Depot.



(U) Figure 1. Captured Weapons Stored at Taji National Depot.

Recommendations (U)

(U) C. We recommend that the Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq, issue formal procedures that:

- (U) 1. Govern the accountability, control, and final disposition of weapons captured by U.S. forces, to include recording captured weapons serial numbers.
- (U) 2. Coordinate the efforts of the Multi-National Corps-Iraq and the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq in processing weapons captured by U.S. forces.

(U) Management Comments to Recommendation C.

- (U) MNF-I concurred, noting that, in coordination with MNF-I and MNSTC-I, MNC-I published Fragmentary Order (FRAGO) 085 on January 28, 2008. The FRAGO was designed to coordinate the transfer of captured enemy weapons (CEW) in a controlled and recorded manner between Coalition forces and ISF. The FRAGO received concurrence from MNF-I and MNSTC-I and modifications are being coordinated to refine the FRAGOs language with respect to weapon categories, serial number requirements, and transfer process flow.
- (U) The Iraqi Ministry of Defense (MoD) Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics concurred with the MNC-I procedures that FRAGO 085 established. The Ministry of Interior (MoI) Assistant Deputy Minister for Infrastructure has verbally committed to MNC-I procedures as well. The two ministries are drafting policies that will compliment the MNC-I FRAGO.
- (U) Assessment Response. Publication of MNC-I FRAGO 085 meets the intent of Recommendation C. Acceptance of those procedures at the appropriate levels in the Iraqi MoD and MoI serves to institutionalize processing and accountability of captured enemy weapons in the Iraqi system as well.

Observation D.

Multi-National Force-Iraq Procedures for Transition Teams (U)

- (U) MNF-I had not issued procedures on the missions, roles, and responsibilities applicable to U.S. and Coalition transition teams and senior advisors involved in advising and assisting the MoD, the MoI, and subordinate ISF organizations on the accountability and control of U.S.-supplied or Iraqi-procured arms and ammunition.
- (U) MNF-I had not issued procedures to coordinate the efforts of MNC-I and MNSTC-I transition teams to support the ISF in its efforts to account and control for U.S.-supplied or Iraqi-procured arms and ammunition.

Roles of Transition Teams (U)

- (U) One of the roles of U.S. transition teams and senior advisors is to mentor their ISF counterparts on the accountability and control of U.S.-supplied or Iraqi-procured arms and ammunition. The mentoring by U.S./Coalition transition teams and senior advisors encompasses the gamut of ISF organizations, from national arms and ammunition depots to military companies and police stations. Mentoring is the process by which transition teams support ISF to establish its sustainment logistics base and to provide for the accountability and control of U.S.-supplied or Iraqi-procured arms and ammunition.
- (U) Multi-National Corps-Iraq Responsibilities. MNC-I has the responsibility for the U.S. transition teams mentoring Iraqi Army divisional units, police transition teams (at police stations), Border Police transition teams, and National Police transition teams (NPTTs).
- (U) Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq Responsibilities. MNSTC-I has the responsibility for the U.S. senior mentors and logistics transition teams mentoring at the MoD, MoI, Taji National Depot, Baghdad Police College (BPC), and Iraqi Base Support Units (formerly Regional Support Units).

Procedures (U)

- (U) The procedures to establish the missions, roles, and responsibilities applicable to U.S. transition teams and senior advisors should address:
 - (U) the mission, roles, and responsibilities applicable to U.S. transition teams and senior advisors;
 - (U) the movement, receipt, storage, accountability, issuance, and inventory record procedures for arms and ammunition;

- (U) the management of arms and ammunition warehouses;
- (U) the recording of the weapons serial numbers;
- (U) the control of the captured, seized, and donated weapons;
- (U) the disposition or the destruction of arms and ammunition; and
- (U) each organizational level of the ISF separately so that the unique requirements at each level are clearly identified.

Recommendations (U)

- (U) D. We recommend that the Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq, issue formal procedures that:
- (U) 1. Describe the mission, roles, and responsibilities applicable to U.S. transition teams and senior advisors involved in advising and assisting the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Interior, and subordinate Iraq Security Forces' organizations on the accountability and control of U.S.-supplied or Iraqi-procured arms and ammunition.
- (U) 2. Coordinate the efforts of the Multi-National Corps-Iraq and the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq transition teams to support the Iraq Security Forces in its efforts to account for and control U.S.-supplied or Iraqi-procured arms and ammunition.

(U) Management Comments to Recommendation D:

- (U) MNF-I concurred, noting that MNSTC-I published a Logistics Accountability SOP on April 26, 2008. The SOP provides specific direction for accountability and control of sensitive items (including arms and ammunition) during: Port of Debarkation operations, intra-theatre distribution, and warehouse operations. MNSTC-I will continue to advise and assist the MoD and MoI in establishing the proposed accountability procedures in the Logistics Accountability SOP.
- (U) MNSTC-I works closely with the MNC-I Military Training Teams (MiTTs) and stated that they will continue to ensure that these teams adhere to the accountability procedures developed by MNSTC-I. MNC-I MiTTs have been directed to continue submitting the required documentation resulting from weapons issued to the Iraqi units.
- (U) Assessment Response: The MNF-I response did not meet the intent of the Recommendation D. in its entirety. The MNSTC-I Logistics Accountability SOP applies only to MNSTC-I personnel. Unless additional action was taken, the MNSTC-I Logistics SOP would have no impact on the actions of U.S and Coalition personnel assigned to MNC-I and other commands involved in the control and accountability of arms and ammunition being provided to the ISF. We discussed this issue with MNF-I and MNC-I during our follow-up

assessment. On June 5, 2008, the MNF-I Chief of Staff issued a memo making the MNSTC-I Logistics SOP applicable to all MNC-I elements "in order to ensure consistent accountability standards across the supply chain in Iraq." This action met the intent of recommendation D.

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Observation E.

Iraq Security Forces Policies and Procedures for the Accountability and Control of Arms and Ammunition (U)

(U) MoD and MoI had not issued written policies and procedures for military and police national arms and ammunition depots and other storage facilities (such as provincial, regional, unit or station levels) for the accountability and control of U.S.-supplied or Iraqi-procured arms and ammunition.

Formal Policies (U)

- (U) Policies and procedures had not been institutionalized in writing by MoD and MoI. While some policies and procedures may have been in place or were being executed in practice, many had not been published formally through approved and signed documents.
- (U) Ministry of Defense. We reviewed nine MoD documents addressing supply and asset accountability. We determined that only two of the nine documents had been completed, translated into Arabic, and contained an appropriate signature by a MoD official. The two documents addressed ammunition management and accountability.
- (U) Ministry of Interior. We reviewed several written documents addressing logistics procedures and accountability at MoI and those documents were written in English, undated, and appeared to be in draft form. We found no indication that formal MoI-approved logistics and accountability policies and procedures existed. We interviewed personnel from several U.S. National Police Transition Teams (NPTTs). None of the NPTT members we interviewed were aware of any written policies or regulation concerning weapons accountability. Further, we did not see any written regulation concerning weapons accountability at the National Police headquarters.

Recommendations (U)

- (U) E. We recommend that the Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq advise and assist the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior in the preparation and promulgation of formal policies and procedures for military and police national arms and ammunition depots and other storage facilities that address the accountability and control of U.S.-supplied or Iraqi-procured arms and ammunition.
- (U) Management Comments to Recommendation E.

- (U) MNF-I concurred, noting that the Iraqi procedures for accountability of equipment, including arms and ammunition, are given in the "Iraqi Supply Handbook," Chapter 3, Property Accountability Guide. That procedure outlines accountability through the use of the Iraqi Army (IA) Form 249 (Blanjo—Iraqi term) and details the procedures. Rather than advising on the creation of an additional policy, MNF-I and MNSTC-I recommended that efforts be focused on assistance of enforcement of policies already in place.
- (U) The Iraqi Joint Headquarters Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics has established a committee that will develop procedures for the accountability of both U.S.-supplied and Iraqi-procured arms and ammunition. The initial report of the committee detailed current and future issues related to the tracking of arms and ammunition from their arrival at Um Qasr or Baghdad International Airport. The current procedure involves the Coalition-contracted movement of arms and ammunition from Um Qasr or Baghdad International Airport to the National Ammunition Depot at Bayji. Contractor personnel conduct receipt inspections of all ammunition and update the National Ammunition Depot master inventory. When arms and ammunition are required at one of the five existing Ammunition Supply Points, MNSTC-I J4 coordinates movement of ammunition to the requesting Ammunition Supply Point through Coalition-contracted movement. Inventories at existing Ammunition Supply Points are currently managed by Iraqi forces with MiTT oversight. Regular inventory reports are submitted to MNSTC-I J4. The procedures for future ammunition accountability of arms and ammunition by MoD are being developed by the committee chaired by the Ammunition Section of Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics.
- (U) The Government of Iraq MoI issued a memorandum to subordinate units, signed by the Assistant Deputy Minister for Administrative Affairs, dated December 18, 2007, directing that weapons and ammunition be secured with three locks, each with a key maintained by an officer with a minimum of four years of experience. Monthly inventories are to be conducted. Stiff fines are established for the loss of any weapon or ammunition. Fines are restated in a separate memorandum #47 signed by the Minister of Interior.
- (U) Assessment Response: The management comments meet the intent of the Recommendation E. We encourage MNF-I mentors/trainers throughout all subordinate commands to validate Iraqi implementation of the provisions of Chapter 3 of the Iraqi Supply Handbook throughout MoD and the provisions of the cited memos throughout MoI.

Observation F.

Iraq Security Forces Policies and Procedures for Captured Weapons (U)

(U) MoD and MoI had not issued written policies and procedures for the accountability, control, and disposition of weapons captured by ISF or U.S. forces (weapons captured by U.S. forces that are subsequently turned over to ISF).

Visibility over Captured Weapons (U)

- (U) We visited the Iraqi Army captured weapons storage site located within the Iraqi military sector of Taji National Depot (TND). U.S. training team personnel held the keys to the approximately 15 weapons storage containers. The weapons had apparently been captured by U.S. forces and turned over to the ISF. Although they were in the process of conducting an inventory, Iraqi and Coalition personnel present could not provide an accurate assessment as to what type or quantity of weapons were being stored in the containers or for how long the weapons had been stored there.
- (U) There was no written guidance on hand from MoD addressing the ultimate disposition of the captured weapons the depot receives.
- (U) Policy and procedures should govern the inventory process for the weapons, the recording of weapons serial numbers, the control of captured weapons during processing, the disposition of weapons by ISF, or the destruction of the weapons that are unserviceable or otherwise unsuitable for military use. The make, model, and serial numbers of captured weapons should be reported to the MNSTC-I J4.

Recommendations (U)

- (U) F. We recommend that the Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq advise and assist the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior in the preparation and promulgation of formal policies and procedures for accountability, control, processing, and final disposition of weapons the Iraq Security Forces capture or weapons captured and turned over to the Iraq Security Forces by Coalition forces.
- (U) Management Comments to Recommendation F.
- (U) MNF-I concurred. They reported that MNSTC-I is aware of the issue and are advising MoD Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics on a directive that is being drafted.

¹⁰ (U) Taji National Depot is the national military depot for the Iraqi military forces and falls under the control of MoD. U.S. embedded training teams work from a small compound within the Iraqi sector of the depot. For the purposes of this report, we identify the U.S. compound as the U.S. team sector within the Iraqi military sector of Taji National Depot.

- (U) While the MoI has not provided a written copy of current policy, MoI officials at the provincial and ministerial levels have confirmed the following procedures are in place:
 - If a police unit captures weapons, they must inventory and inspect each weapon by serial number.
 - The inventory is passed to the MoI Auditing Department and compared against their weapons databases to determine the source.
 - The capturing unit may request to retain the weapons to fill shortages or permission to destroy the weapons. The MoI Director of Logistics will provide disposition instructions.
 - If the weapons are destroyed, a committee of three senior officers must witness the destruction and provide certification to the MoI Logistics Officer.
- (U) Assessment Response. The management comments meet the intent of Recommendation F. MNSTC-I should continue to follow-up with MoD and MoI on this issue.

Part II (U) DoD and Iraq Security Forces Operations (U)

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Observation G.

Chain of Custody, Delivery Process, and Storage of U.S.-Controlled Weapons Provided to the Iraq Security Forces (U)

- (U) U.S. forces did not always maintain an unbroken chain of custody for the accountability and control of U.S-controlled arms and ammunition before formal handover to the Iraq Security Forces (ISF). Further, U.S. arms and ammunition were placed temporarily in areas that lacked sufficient physical security to prevent misplacement, loss, or theft and sufficient storage capacity to efficiently process deliveries for the anticipated volume of arms and ammunition shipments procured through the ISFF and FMS.
- (U) In addition, U.S. forces and ISF did not always perform joint inventories of U.S.-controlled weapons prior to formal handover to ISF at TND or BPC. Serial numbers for weapons were not always recorded at TND. Finally, Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan contracts for the procurement of weapons did not always contain clauses requiring lists of weapons' serial numbers be sent in advance of weapons' shipment to Iraq, the delivery of arms and ammunition to Iraq through U.S.-controlled ports of entry within Iraq, or that shippers provide enroute visibility to include the arrival dates and times of arms and ammunition cargo being delivered to Iraq.


Chain of Custody for Controlled Inventory Items (U)


- (U) According to DoDI 5000.64, controlled inventory items include property with characteristics that may require them to be identified, accounted for, secured, segregated, or handled in a special manner to ensure their safekeeping and integrity. DoD 4100.39-M, "Federal Logistics Information System," Volume 10, Table 61, November 2007, includes AA&E as controlled inventory items.
- (U) An unbroken chain of custody for arms and ammunition needs to be maintained throughout the logistics supply chain to include shipping, handling, delivery, receipt, storage, and issuance process. The main objective of a chain of custody is to ensure that arms and ammunition are tracked through the process between procurement and delivery to the ultimate recipient and that the arms and ammunition received by the ultimate recipient are in the same condition, type, and count as originally shipped.
- (U) A chain of custody requires that every transfer of goods from organization to organization be documented by authorized individuals, and that those records contain evidence for the entire chain of custody process.
- (U) The chain of custody process to provide weapons to ISF should require that serial numbers of weapons be recorded at the point of formal handover to ISF to

strengthen U.S. and ISF accountability and control. This is necessary to provide specific accountability of receipt of weapons delivered to ISF by the U.S. and to facilitate ISF establishing a chain of custody for the U.S.-provided weapons.


(U) In addition, a chain of custody by serial number would enable U.S. forces and Government of Iraq law enforcement agencies to obtain serial numbers for weapons found to be missing, lost, or stolen to identify the last accountable entity for those weapons. That information would provide a starting point for investigative officials to trace weapons and determine the cause of the loss.

In-Country Delivery Process through Baghdad International Airport (U)






(U) Figure 2. U.S.-supplied Equipment being Unloaded by Iraqi Airways Personnel at Baghdad International Airport.







Temporary Storage for Weapons in the Delivery Process (U)



- (U) Storage Capacity at Baghdad International Airport and Balad Air Base. The DoD report to Congress entitled "Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq," December 17, 2007, stated:
 - (U) During this quarter, substantially increased quantities of Iraqi-funded equipment ordered through the U.S Foreign Military Sales (FMS) system have entered into the transportation and distribution pipeline, resulting in a significant buildup of materiel extending from Iraq back to the departure point in Charleston, South Carolina. For example, there are approximately 75 pallets and nearly 250 vehicles awaiting transportation in Charleston.





^{11 (}U) Balad Air Base is operated by the U.S. Air Force and is the primary air port-of-entry for delivering cargo to U.S. forces in Iraq.



In-Country Delivery Processes to Taji National Depot (U)


(U) There were two different delivery processes for U.S.-controlled weapons flowing through the port of entry at Baghdad International Airport to Iraqi military forces at Taji National Depot. We observed problems with the chain of custody during our review of both processes.





(U) Figure 3. U.S.-supplied M-16A4 Rifles Arrive at


Taji National Depot.




(U) There were other delivery processes in place at other Iraqi ports of entry (Umm Qsar), but we did not examine those during this assessment because of time constraints.

In-Country Delivery Process to Baghdad Police College (U)

(U) We observed a problem with the chain of custody for arms and ammunition during our visit to the BPC.







(U) Figure 4. Weapons Storage Warehouses at Baghdad Police College.



Accountability for Weapons in the Delivery Process (U)


- (U) By regulation, weapons are sensitive items within DoD. Serial number accountability and joint weapons inventories provide a higher level and more precise chain of custody control.
- (U) Serial Number Lists. The containers (such as pallets or cases) holding the weapons shipped to ISF did not include lists of serial numbers. Moreover, lists of serial numbers were almost never provided by the shipper in advance. Vendors and shippers were not normally required by contracts to provide those lists.
- (U) Serial number lists for weapons shipments should be provided in advance (preferably electronically) to the Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan contracting officer, the MNSTC-I logistics function, and the Logistics Movement Coordination Center (Gulf Region Division, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers). Having access to a list of serial numbers provided in advance by the shipper greatly improves the visibility over weapons.

¹² (U) The Baghdad Police College is the national police arms and ammunition depot for the Iraqi police forces and is under the control of MoI.

- (U) Serial number lists should also be posted on the outside of weapons shipping containers, along with other shipping documents, and on the inside of weapons shipping containers to be available for those involved in the delivery and storage process. A comparison of weapons serial numbers recorded at the time of a joint inventory to those shown on the serial number lists accompanying the containers improves the accountability and control for the weapons. Those lists of serial numbers provide the precision required for a strong chain of custody for a DoD-controlled sensitive inventory item.
- (U) Joint Weapons Inventories. The delivery of weapons to TND and BPC without an immediate joint U.S. forces and ISF inventory (by weapon count, weapons type, and serial number) prior to formal handover broke the U.S. chain of custody. Once the chain of custody for weapons has been broken, there is no assurance that weapons were not or could not be misplaced, lost, or stolen between the time the weapons were placed under ISF control and a formal joint inventory was performed.

Recommendations (U)


(U) G.1. We recommend that the Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq:




- (U) Assessment Response. The management comments meet the requirements of Recommendation G.1.a.
- (U) The initial comments only partially met the intent of Recommendation G.1.b. During out follow-up assessment, MNSTC-I provided documentation requiring arms and ammunition to be in a secured facility and/or under a 24-hour guard by U.S. personnel until formal transfer to the Iraqis. In the case of weapons, the formal transfer to the Iraqis required a joint serial number inventory. These

actions met the intent of recommendation G.1.b.

(U) G.2. We recommend that the Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq, with advice and assistance from the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior, jointly develop formal procedures for the delivery, joint inventory, and formal handover of U.S.-controlled arms and ammunition provided to the Iraq Security Forces, requiring that:



(U) c. A 100 percent joint inventory of weapons (by weapons count, weapons type, and serial number) be performed with authorized Iraq Security Forces officials at the time of delivery and formal handover to the Iraq Security Forces.



(U) Assessment Response. The management comments meet the intent of the Recommendation G.2.

(U) G.3. We recommend that the Commander, Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan review all their contracts issued to procure and deliver arms and ammunition to ensure that clauses are included requiring vendors and shippers:

(U) a. Deliver arms and ammunition to Iraq through U.S.-controlled ports of entry within Iraq. The contract procedures and the procurement contracts should comply with the procedures issued by the Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq, as discussed in Recommendation G.1.a.

(U) b. Provide serial number lists electronically in advance of any weapons shipments to Iraq and post serial number lists on the outside of weapons shipping containers along with other required shipping documents and also on the inside of weapons shipping containers.

(U) c. Provide enroute visibility to include the arrival dates and times of arms and ammunition cargo being delivered to Iraq.

(U) Management Comments to Recommendation G.3.

- (U) MNF-I concurred. They reported that Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan has been including serial number instructions for weapons as of September 2007. Additionally, sensitive item shipping instructions are included in contracts IAW Gulf Region Division memorandum dated May 18, 2007. Those instructions provide tracking and accountability controls up to acceptance by the Government from the contractor or its shipper.
- (U) Assessment Response. The initial management comments did not meet the intent of the Recommendation G.3.a. However, during our follow-up assessment, the Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan provided a response indicating that vendors and shippers would only deliver arms and ammunition to Iraq through U.S.-controlled ports of entry within Iraq. This action met the intent of recommendation G.3.a.
- (U) The management comments meet the intent of Recommendations G.3.b and G.3.c.

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Observation H.

Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq Database of Weapons Serial Numbers (U)

(U) The process to populate the MNSTC-I centralized database of weapons serial numbers for weapons issued to ISF by U.S. forces lacked sufficient internal data input controls. Errors identified included partial weapons serial numbers, extraneous characters within the weapons serial numbers that rendered the entry unusable, mislabeled weapon manufacturer identification, and data entered into the wrong database columns.

Centralized Database of Weapons Serial Numbers (U)

- (U) MNSTC-I has maintained a centralized database of serial numbers for weapons issued to ISF since early 2006 and at the same time initiated a process for providing those serial numbers to the DoD Small Arms Serialization Program. The U.S. Army Materiel Command Logistics Support Activity manages the DoD Small Arms Serialization Program and maintains standards for data input quality controls for the database.
- (U) Since 2006, MNSTC-I has been recording serial numbers from new weapons distributed to ISF. MNSTC-I is also collecting hand receipts for weapons previously issued to the ISF from 2003 through 2005 in order to record the serial numbers.

Recommendations (U)

- (U) H.1. We recommend that the Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq install data input quality controls in their centralized database of weapons serial numbers using a trained database programmer.
- (U) H.2. We recommend that the Commander, U.S. Army Materiel Command Logistics Support Activity assist/support the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq with installing data input quality controls in the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq centralized database of weapons serial numbers to ensure system compatibility.
- (U) Management Comments to Recommendation H. The Army and MNF-I concurred. MNSTC-I requested U.S. Army Materiel Command Logistics Support Activity assistance. A Logistics Support Activity representative visited MNSTC-I in February 2008, identifying necessary corrections that have been implemented. MNSTC-I is now sourcing a contracted solution for a commercial database to further enhance data integrity and provide continuity.

(U) Assessment Response. The management comments meet the intent of the Recommendation H.


Observation I.

Management of Iraqi Arms and Ammunition at Taji National Depot and Baghdad Police College (U)

(U) We performed a physical count of three selected Iraq military weapon types and compared those counts to the inventory database maintained at Taji National Depot (TND). The physical count of the three types of weapons did not match the numbers of weapons recorded in the inventory database. In addition, the team was unable to locate all of the three types of weapons in TND because of the disorganized manner in which the weapons were physically stored. Further, the BPC did not have sufficient storage capacity for the anticipated volume of arms and ammunition shipments procured through the ISFF and FMS.

Weapons Inventory Sample Results (U)

(U) A judgment sample inventory of AK-47 rifles (Kalashnikov Model Automatic Rifle of 1947) at Taji National Depot showed that rifles in storage exceeded the number listed in the inventory database by a count of 16,841. Judgment sample inventories of RPG-7 (Rocket Propelled Grenade) Launchers and Kalashnikov Machine Guns-Modernized (also know as PKM machine guns) determined that the numbers counted were less than the amounts recorded in the inventory database by 5,664 and 3,988, respectively. Figure 5. shows DoD IG personnel inspecting and counting weapons at TND.



(U) Figure 5. DoD IG Personnel Manually Inspect Weapon Inventories at Taji National Depot.

Weapons Storage (U)

- (U) Iraqi weapons and ammunition of the same type were randomly stored in multiple warehouses at TND. There was no particular storage order or system to allow for their efficient retrieval.
- (U) BPC did not have sufficient warehouse capacity for the secure storage of anticipated FMS arms and ammunition shipments.

Recommendations (U)

- (U) I.1. We recommend that the Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq advise and assist the Ministry of Defense in:
- (U) a. Performing a 100 percent joint U.S. forces and Iraq Security Forces inventory that will establish a baseline for Iraqi military weapons and ammunition stored at Taji National Depot and will record serial numbers of U.S.-provided weapons.
- (U) b. Performing a 10 percent sample inventory of Iraqi military weapons and ammunition on a monthly basis to maintain data integrity of the inventory database.
- (U) c. Establishing effective warehouse management and organization processes at Taji National Depot for the storage of weapons and ammunition and requesting help from U.S.-based logistics organizations as needed.

(U) Management Comments to Recommendation I.1.

- (U) MNF-I concurred, noting that MNSTC-I is conducting a 100 percent inventory check of all procured weapons (from either Iraq Security Forces Fund [ISFF] or Foreign Military Sales [FMS] funds) held at TND in coordination with the Iraqis. MoD is conducting checks of ammunition at Taji each week and reports stocks on hand to MNSTC-I. A 100 percent inventory of ammunition has not yet been completed by MNSTC-I personnel. Once weapons are transferred to the ISF, MNSTC-I does not have the manpower required to conduct monthly 10 percent checks, but will recommend to ISF Commanders that such an inventory be included in their regulations.
- (U) The Coalition Army Advisory Training Team (CAATT) is focusing on the mentoring of the TND leadership to effectively manage warehouse operations, stock control procedures and inventory management. CAATT's goal is to have the Iraqis accurately receive, store, and inventory stocks. Additionally, the Iraqis must also manage the workload to pick, pack, and ship stocks to the Location Commands and the ISF. The Logistics Management Advisory Team (LMAT) will oversee the progress of the Iraqis in those areas to enable the Iraqis to execute supply depot operations. The purpose of that process is the successful transition to MoD control.

- (U) Assessment Response: The management comments meet the intent of the Recommendation I.1.
- (U) I.2. We recommend that the Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq advise and assist the Ministry of Interior to construct sufficient capacity for arms and ammunition storage at Baghdad Police College and other sites as necessary for the anticipated volume of arms and ammunition shipments.
- (U) Management Comments to Recommendation I.2. MNF-I concurred. The MoI is constrained for storage space for inbound weapons and ammunition and employs a 3-pronged approach to alleviate this problem. The first step is to increase the rate of throughput to subordinate organizations. The second step is to use temporary container storage in the newly constructed container yard. The third step is to divert ammunition to the Abu Gharaib warehouse complex, where MoI is planning on establishing a permanent workforce within the next 60 days. The Coalition is funding the construction of 12K square meters of storage space under a K-span design on BPC. This project is estimated to be completed by May 28, 2008. Once complete, all of the hardened warehouses will be freed up for ammunition storage.
- (U) Assessment Response. The management comments meet the intent of Recommendation I.2.


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
Observation J.

Management of Iraqi Army Ammunition at Bayji National Ammunition Depot (U)

(U) The Bayji National Ammunition Depot was operated by a U.S. contractor under the supervision of the Gulf Region Division, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. There were no Iraqi military or civilian personnel assigned to the depot or present. In addition, the depot lacked adequate materiel handling equipment for the loading and unloading of ammunition containers. Further, the depot also contained a large stockpile of outdated and unserviceable Iraqi military ammunition.


Bayji National Ammunition Depot Operations (U)





(U) Figure 6. Weapons Stored in the Open at Bayji National Ammunition Depot.

Recommendations (U)



(U) The management comments meet the intent of recommendations J.1 and J.2.



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Observation K.

Serial Number Accountability for Iraq Security Forces Weapons (U)

- (U) Data gathered from U.S. military transition teams supporting four Iraqi Divisions on the accountability of arms and ammunition indicated that approximately 85 percent of the Iraqi Army units in those divisions were accounting for weapons by serial number, with plans to attain 100 percent. Further, the MoI started recording serial numbers of weapons issued to police forces in January 2007.
- (U) Although the MoI has begun to develop a centralized database to record serial numbers of MoI weapons, we found no indication of a similar effort underway in the MoD.

Serial Number Accountability in the Ministry of Defense (U)

- (U) U.S. M16A4 and M4 rifles purchased and supplied through the FMS program were being issued to Iraqi Army soldiers by serial number. Iraqi Army units used biometric technology to link together the soldier's fingerprints, photographs, an iris scan, and other personal identifying information.
- (U) The Iraq Assistance Group (a subordinate organization of MNC-I) queried U.S. military transition teams assigned to four Iraqi Army Divisions about the accountability and control of arms and ammunition. That data indicated that approximately 85 percent of the Iraqi Army units in those divisions were accounting for weapons by serial number. The remaining 15 percent of units accounted for weapons by type and quantity, not by serial number. The transition teams planned to work with their Iraqi counterparts to reach the goal of 100 percent serial number accountability in all units down to company level.
- (U) In addition, the transition teams assigned to the Iraqi 4th Division reported that all Iraqi weapons in that unit were accounted for by serial number. They also noted that the serial numbers of the 4th Division's weapons had been forwarded up the U.S. chain of command. A full serial number inventory of all weapons in the Iraqi 4th Division was completed every 90 days in each subordinate unit.

Visits to Iraqi Army Units (U)

- (U) We inspected arms rooms in four Iraqi Army units in different Iraqi Army Divisions. We found that all the weapons stored were being accounted for by serial number in their respective property books and arms room log books.
- (U) We also visited four of the five Iraqi Army Regional Base Support Units.

One of the units visited was newly organized and had no arms or ammunition on hand, but personnel were aware of the requirement to account for weapons by serial number. Two of the remaining three units had accounted by serial number for the weapons in storage at their locations. The fourth unit visited had accounted for the weapons at that location by quantity and type, but had not yet completed a serial number inventory. That unit subsequently reported completion of the serial number inventory after the assessment team visit.

(U) Further, we tracked a direct issue of 258 Glock 9mm pistols from TND to the 4th Brigade, 9th Iraqi Division. The pistols were recorded by serial number on the unit property books at the appropriate organizational levels. We specifically followed 33 of the pistols down to a company arms room. The arms room had 30 of the pistols stored and accounted for by serial number. The three other pistols were signed out for the day, by serial number, on the arms room log book.

Serial Number Accountability in the Ministry of Interior (U)

- (U) Since January 2007, the MoI Director General of Logistics has controlled the issuance of arms and ammunition to the police forces. The MoI received arms and ammunition at the MoI central warehouse facilities located at the BPC for the Iraqi Police Service, the National Police, and the Border and Ports Police, which included more than 40,000 weapons and 27 million rounds of ammunition issued from January through August 2007.
- (U) MoI and U.S. Civilian Police Assistance Training Team officials conducted a joint inventory of the weapons by serial number the day after the shipment arrived at BPC physically opening the crates and manually recording serial numbers onto a standard form. Civilian Police Assistance Training Team officials scanned that form and sent it to Civilian Police Assistance Training Team headquarters and MNSTC-I J4 for processing into the MNSTC-I weapons serial number database. The serial numbers were also entered into the MoI centralized weapons database.
- (U) The MoI weapons database has been in existence since January 2007. The MoI Director General for Logistics stated that the database accounted for 100 percent of the weapons issued since then (by serial number, the name of policeman, and the activity to which the weapon was issued). He also stated that he has automated archived records of previously issued weapons that he believed to be about 50 percent complete for years before 2007. He hoped to have 75 percent of the serial numbers in the archived database by the end of 2007.
- (U) The logistics officers for the National Police, Department of Border Enforcement and each of the Provincial Directors of Police submitted a formal memorandum to the MoI to request additional weapons. Each request was compared against the central weapons database to determine whether the receiving organization or unit had a requirement for the weapons. The MoI Logistics Section then submitted the request to the MoI Deputy Minister of Administration for ultimate approval. Once approved, the weapons were issued and signed for by the issuing official and the receiving unit's logistics officer and senior officer.

- (U) Individual weapons were issued only to policemen who had a MoI identification badge. The individual policeman who signed for the weapon had to be properly vetted, which is a 4-month process. The MoI would not issue weapons to any subordinate unit until they had received a comprehensive listing of the unit name and of the policeman for whom the weapon was intended. The listing must also include a signature of a fiscally responsible agent who accepted personal responsibility for the officer's reliability. The individual police officer must sign a form indicating receipt of the weapon at the time of issue.
- (U) All police officers who were authorized to receive an individual weapon were required to submit a vetting file through their chain of command to the MoI. The file included a guarantee to repay the MoI 5 million dinars ¹³ in the event the weapon was lost or stolen. That guarantee was intended to ensure that the police officer would not sell the weapon on the black market. The MoI maintains the records of all police who have been issued weapons. Unit weapons, such as AK-47 rifles, are issued from the station armory on an ad hoc basis. Inventories and log books are maintained for weapons issued and returned at the unit level.

Visits to Iraqi Police Organizations (U)

- (U) We interviewed National Police Transition Team (NPTT) and Iraqi National Police logistics personnel at the National Police headquarters in Baghdad. The NPTT logisticians have been working toward total inventory accountability of National Police equipment since July 2006, including recording of serial numbers of all weapons the National Police maintain. However, the NPTT had not been instructed to send recorded serial numbers to MNSTC-I for entry into the MNSTC-I weapons serial number database.
- (U) Requisitioning Arms and Ammunition by National Police Units.

 National Police units requisitioned arms and ammunition directly from their national headquarters. The requests were forwarded to the MoI headquarters. Once approved, the National Police logistics function picked up the weapons from the BPC depot for delivery to the National Police units. When the weapons were issued, the National Police logistics function reportedly received and recorded the name of the specific policeman who had received the weapon, along with the weapon serial number. Although the procedures were being followed at the police organizations we visited, we can not necessarily project that result to all other police organizations.
- (U) We interviewed the NPTTs embedded with the 5th Brigade, 2nd National Police Division, and confirmed that weapons in the 5th Brigade were accounted for by serial number and linked to the individual policemen to whom the weapon had been issued. Weapons not yet issued were kept in the unit arms room and inventoried, by serial number, on a monthly basis. However, we did not see any written regulation concerning weapons accountability at the National Police headquarters and no NPTT members we interviewed were aware of any written policies or regulations.

¹³ Unit of currency issued by the Government of Iraq.

- (U) Requisitioning Arms and Ammunition by Police Service Stations. We interviewed the Provincial Director of Police for the Iraqi Police Service in Ninawa Province and his logistics director. We also visited a local police station in Mosul. The Iraqi Police Service followed a similar procedure for requisitioning and accounting for weapons as did the National Police. A formal request for the issue of an individual handgun to a policeman was made by the local station chief. The request contained a number of documents clearly identifying the individual who was to receive the weapon.
- (U) Once approved, the weapon was issued by serial number and that information was recorded at the local police station and in the MoI weapons database. Only those policemen who had undergone this lengthy and formal vetting and identification process and who possessed a MoI identification badge were issued handguns. Rifles and larger weapons were kept in the local police station arms room and issued only for specific operations. They were also accounted for in the unit's weapons property book by serial number.

Recommendations (U)

- (U) K.1. We recommend that the Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq assist the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior and their subordinate military and police organizations in attaining and maintaining 100 percent accountability and control of Iraq Security Forces weapons by serial numbers.
- (U) Management Comments to Recommendation K.1. MNF-I concurred, noting that they will continue to direct MNSTC-I to advise and assist MoD and MoI with regard to directing their subordinate organizations to gain and maintain 100 percent accountability of all weapons by serial number.
- (U) Assessment Response. The management comments meet the intent of Recommendation K.1.
- (U) K.2. We recommend that the Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq instruct all Coalition Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq military transition teams to assist/mentor the appropriate Iraqi personnel in the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior in development of their own centralized database of weapons serial numbers.
- (U) Management Comments to Recommendation K.2. MNF-I nonconcurred with the recommendation as it was initially written, because it implied that MNSTC-I should register all Iraqi weapons in the MNSTC-I weapons serial number database. MNSTC-I reported that its database only covers and tracks ISFF procured weapons, those re-issued under the Captured Enemy Weapon (CEW) program (through TND), and those procured through the U.S. FMS program. Tracking weapons procured by the Government of Iraq directly from non-U.S. sources is a Government of Iraq responsibility. MNSTC-I noted that it did not have the manpower to track that subset of weapons, even if the Government of Iraq were to provide the serial numbers.

(U) Assessment Response. On the basis of these comments, we modified our recommendation K.2 to read as written above, encouraging the MoD and MoI to develop their own weapons serial number databases.

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Part III (U) DoD Personnel Resources (U)

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Observation L.

Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq Staffing and Oversight Functions (U)

(U) The MNSTC-I J4 (logistics function) did not have sufficient personnel and those they had did not have the requisite skills and experience levels to carry out its logistics mission (including arms and ammunition oversight). Further, MNSTC-I program oversight was hindered because the command did not have an Inspector General and had only one internal audit liaison officer.

Logistics Organization – Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq J4 (U)

(U) The MNSTC-I J4 logistics support function had 64 personnel assigned as of September 2007. It appeared that those 64 personnel were insufficient for the scope of the mission and did not always have the right mix of skills or experience levels.

Oversight Organization Comparison (U)

(U) Authorized personnel assigned to MNSTC-I and DoD equivalent commands.

DoD Organization	Authorized IG Personnel	Authorized Audit Personnel	Fiscal Year 2007 Budget
MNSTC-I	0	1	\$5.5 billion
TRADOC*	18	8	\$3.2 billion
TACOM**	11	7	\$3.6 billion

* (U) U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command

Recommendations (U)

- (U) L.1. We recommend that the Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq:
 - (U) a. Approve a Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq Joint Manning Document that provides for sufficient numbers of personnel and identifies the requisite skills and experience levels to

^{** (}U) U.S. Army Tank, Automotive, and Life Cycle Management Command

successfully execute its logistics mission.

- (U) b. Establish an Office of Inspector General and an Office of Internal Review in the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq Joint Manning Document that provides for sufficient numbers of personnel and identifies the requisite skills and experience levels to successfully execute their oversight mission.
- (U) Management Comments L.1. MNF-I concurred. MNSTC-I completed a comprehensive personnel manning review in the fall of 2007 which resulted in the recommendation to modify the JMD in order to source the requirements shortfalls identified above. In February 2008, the Commander, MNF-I approved the MSNTC-I JMD change proposal. If approved and sourced by the Joint Staff, that JMD change increases overall manning in the MNSTC-I J4 by 46 percent (an increase from 64 to 94 personnel). The proposed JMD also reflects a net increase of five personnel within the MNSTC-I Office of the Inspector General, to include an internal review function.
- (U) Assessment Response. The management comments meet the intent of the recommendation L.1.
- (U) L.2. We recommend that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Commander, U.S. Central Command, expedite:
 - (U) a. Approval of the proposed Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq Joint Manning Document and request the necessary funding to accomplish the actions cited in recommendations L.1.a. and L.1.b.
 - (U) b. Assignment of personnel with the requisite skills, experience level, and rank to fill the positions designated in the Joint Manning Document for the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq logistics function, the Office of Inspector General, and the Office of Internal Review.

(U) Management Comments to Recommendation L.2.

- (U) USCENTCOM concurred, noting they received the MNF-I out-of-cycle request to modify the MNSTC-I JMD in March 2008. USCENTCOM Directors are in the process of validating the MNSTC-I JMD for submission to the Combatant Commander for approval. USCENTCOM expects to submit an approved document to the Joint Staff not later than June 1, 2008.
- (U) The Joint Staff concurred, noting that they actively pursued the staffing of all JMDs that had been validated and forwarded by the combatant commands. The Joint Staff reports that MNSTC-I is currently manned at 95 percent. As a subset of that manning, MNSTC-I's individual augmentation billets show a Service commitment to sourcing of 94 percent.

(U) Assessment Response. The management comments meet the intent of the recommendation L.2.


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Part IV (U) Foreign Military Sales (U)

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Observation M.

Foreign Military Sales Program Performance (U)



Foreign Military Sales - Background (U)

- (U) The FMS program has historically functioned primarily as a peacetime security assistance organization. A well-established FMS program enables the U.S. to further develop and maintain close bilateral political and interoperable military ties with other countries and, therefore, supports key U.S. national security interests abroad.
- (U) Prior to 2007, funding for the ISF equipment and training was funded primarily through the ISFF. As Iraq begins to use its national funds for self-support, the U.S. FMS program forms the centerpiece for Government of Iraq purchases of equipment and training for ISF. We must work hard to keep it that way, for many reasons.
- (U) FMS shipments to Iraq will sharply increase over the next few years as several billion dollars in Iraqi purchases, already made or anticipated, surge through the system. Responsive support beyond the norm is essential for rapid ISF force generation, replacement of combat losses, and force modernization. The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) reports that approximately \$1 billion in equipment has already been delivered to ISF under FMS.
- (U) The Commander, MNC-I pointed out in January 2008 that Iraq's most significant problem remains equipping and sustaining ISF. To achieve that objective, the Government of Iraq is also considering purchasing arms and ammunition from other foreign suppliers, in addition to the United States.


- (U) Therefore, it is urgent that in 2008, the FMS program matures and demonstrates it can meet the ISF requirements for force expansion, modernization, and replacement of combat losses.
- (U) The MNSTC-I security assistance office will eventually transition into an Office of Security Cooperation under Chief of Mission authority as MNSTC-I phases out.

Recent Accomplishments in Iraqi FMS Program (U)

- (U) Foreign Military Sales Task Force. The Deputy Secretary of Defense formed a Task Force in 2007 that proposed a number of constructive actions, some of which have already been implemented, to increase the effectiveness of the FMS program. That initiative includes providing additional staffing and training, both for U.S. personnel in the Security Assistance Office (SAO) in MNSTC-I and U.S.-based organizations; developing a multi-year equipment requirements plan; training Iraqi MoD and MoI personnel on FMS; working to eliminate transportation backlogs; providing transportation visibility; and seeking U.S. legislative changes to improve FMS responsiveness.
- (U) Security Assistance Office. The Task Force determined that the SAO in MNSTC-I was not adequately staffed to manage the critical FMS equipping mission. The Egypt and Saudi Arabia SAOs, for example, have staffs with 57 and 77 personnel, respectively, but each manages a smaller security assistance program in dollars than that of the program anticipated in Iraq, and they are not supporting a war. To provide the SAO more senior leadership, a general officer deployed to Iraq in January 2008 to lead the office. Also, the SAO will receive additional personnel spaces in a revised Joint Manning Document.
- (U) Intensive Management Office. An Intensive Management Office was established in the U.S. Army Security Assistance Command in 2006 to support Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. The additional staff allocated as a result provided experienced FMS personnel that were essential in supporting case processing for Iraq.
- (U) Transportation and Deliveries. The FMS port of embarkation was shifted from Charleston Air Force Base to Dover Air Force Base in late 2007 to improve transport efficiency. Radio Frequency Identification tags are now mandatory on all FMS shipments to increase in-transit visibility. And, over 80 percent of Iraq-funded FMS defense articles are now air transported from the U.S. through the Defense Transportation Service.
- (U) Diversions. Using diversion authority, high priority FMS items for Iraq are being selectively diverted from other intended uses. In these instances, delivery time to Iraq has been substantially reduced.
- (U) Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management. Mobile training teams from the Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management have deployed to Iraq over the past year and a half. They have trained 120

Government of Iraq personnel and 61 U.S. personnel, which is greatly enhancing their ability to use FMS as the principal means to equip and sustain ISF.

Iraqi Foreign Military Sales Issues and Opportunities (U)



- (U) Defense Coalition Support Account. The acquisition process is a fundamental element of the FMS program. Difficulty in achieving more responsive equipment deliveries to Iraq can be partly traced to the long lead time in acquisition. An FMS process known as the Defense Coalition Support Account, not currently in use, could provide the necessary authority to prepurchase critically needed equipment and high volume items, such as certain weapons, radios, body armor, and ammunition, and place them in stock. If that fund were established, thus making equipment immediately available, the ISF train and equip mission in Iraq would receive more timely deliveries.
- (U) Security Assistance Office Staffing. USCENTCOM and MNSTC-I have not been able to make the progress required to increase the manning requirements of the SAO. Experienced and trained individuals are essential not only for case processing and execution, but also for mentoring ISF officials on FMS program tracking, controlling and accounting for the arrival of cargo, including sensitive items such as arms and ammunition. Only by thoroughly understanding all phases of the security assistance program can SAO officials make a significant difference.

- (U) Iraq Security Forces Mentoring. Additional and continuous mentoring is needed for ISF personnel who work with the FMS program. While field teams from the Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management have been to Iraq to conduct training, the first line effort must be made by the SAO team in-country. MNSTC-I and its SAO team, along with other senior training and mentoring officials, should be educating ISF on FMS processes and expectations and building strong relationships based on mutual trust and confidence.
- (U) Planning Cases. Planning cases provide the customer/requestor advance budget planning data. Planning cases also serve as information to the security assistance community about items of interest that may become formal Letters of Request. Therefore, the use of price and availability cases (planning cases) could improve the security assistance effectiveness provided to the Iraqi FMS program by projecting multi-year planning assumptions, with prices and availability information to support the FMS process in Iraq. That forecasting would facilitate FMS planning by providing the Iraqis assurances for a period of time regarding U.S. price and availability of Defense articles and services.

Recommendations (U)

- (U) M.1. We recommend that the Secretary of Defense appoint a Department of Defense Executive Agent for the Iraqi Foreign Military Sales program. Consideration should be given to designating the Secretary of the Army as the Executive Agent. The Executive Agent will activate a Joint Program Management Office that will focus full-time on support for ISF, seven days per week to:
- (U) a. Integrate, expedite, coordinate and drive the Iraqi Foreign Military Sales program in the United States, increase the responsiveness of the support effort for the U.S. commanders, and meet the wartime requirements of the Iraq Security Forces. This is an operational, not a policy, office or another bureaucratic layer. The office's only mission is to ensure the support in the security assistance area is provided to U.S. Central Command, Multi-National Force-Iraq and Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq.
- (U) b. Ensure U.S. Central Command, Multi-National Force-Iraq, Multi-National Corps-Iraq and Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq have the support needed, as required and on-time, to better assist MoD and MoI to build combat ready military and police forces.
- (U) Management Comments to Recommendation M.1.
- (U) The Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) (USD[P]) nonconcurred, noting that

an Executive Agent for FMS already exists. ¹⁴ DoD Directive 5106.65, paragraph 3, provides: "the DSCA (Defense Security Cooperation Agency) shall direct, administer, and provide overall policy guidance for the execution of security cooperation and additional DoD programs in accordance with the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended,...and this Directive."

- (U) Establishment of a formal Joint Program Management Office for the Iraq FMS program would create unneeded bureaucracy and is not necessary in view of actions already taken to improve the responsiveness of Iraq FMS. The Deputy Secretary of Defense created an Iraq FMS Task Force in August 2007 to assist the DoD leadership to monitor the implementation of Iraq's FMS program, ensure coordination among relevant organizations, and improve the processing and delivery of Iraq FMS cases. Further, DSCA has established an internal Iraq Integrated Project Team and assigned an experienced FMS manager, whose sole job is to lead the Iraq FMS team.
- (U) Moreover, the establishment of a U.S.-based Joint Program Management Office to implement integration and coordination of a country's FMS program would, in general, need to be requested by the government of that country and funded by it. Under the Arms Export Control Act, the President may sell defense services or contract services. Section 21(a)(1)(C) of the Arms Export Control Act states that for defense services, the purchaser must agree to pay in U.S. dollars, "the full cost to the U.S. Government of furnishing such service."
- (U) The Secretary of the Army nonconcurred with the last sentence in Observation M (page 59) about the responsiveness of the FMS program to the ISF's urgent need, stating that the observation required additional analysis. He also nonconcurred with Recommendation M.1.b, noting that the Defense Technology Security Administration was already performing the function of the proposed Joint Program Management Office. He also noted that the Army had diverted thousands of items from inventory and accelerated delivery of numerous commodities. The Army reports that it has sufficient processes in place to achieve and maintain operational awareness with MNSTC-I, DSCA, and Army stakeholders.
- (U) Assessment Response. We did not modify our recommendation, based on the following analysis.
- (U) **DoD Guidance.** DoD Directives (DoDD) 5111.1, 5106.65 and 5101.1 provide relevant guidance concerning the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD[P]), the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), and the appointment of a DoD Executive Agent, respectively.
- (U) **DoD Directive 5111.1.** DoDD 5111.1, "USD(P)," December 8, 1999, states that USD(P) is the principal staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) and the Deputy Secretary of Defense (DEPSECDEF) for all matters on the formulation of national security and defense

The USD(P) response is included with the USD(AT&L) response signed by the Principal Deputy Secretary of Defense, Joseph A. Benkert. See Appendix E.

policy and the integration and oversight of DoD policy and plans to achieve national security objectives. The Directive also states that USD(P) shall develop, coordinate, and oversee the implementation of DoD policy and plans for defense security assistance.

- (U) **DoD Directive 5106.65.** DoDD 5106.65, "Defense Security Cooperation Agency," October 31, 2000, states DSCA is an agency of DoD under the authority, direction, and control of USD(P) and that the Director, DSCA, shall be appointed by and report to USD(P) through the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (DSCA now reports through the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security Affairs (ASD[GSA]), who, under USD(P), shall exercise authority, direction, and control over DSCA.
- (U) **DoD Directive 5101.1.** DoDD 5101.1 defines a DoD Executive Agent as the Head of a DoD Component to whom SECDEF or DEPSECDEF has assigned specific responsibilities, functions, and authorities to provide defined levels of support for operational missions, or administrative or other designated activities that involve two or more of the DoD Components. DoDD 5101.1 also states only SECDEF or DEPSECDEF may designate a DoD Executive Agent.
- (U) Defense Security Cooperation Agency as Foreign Military Sales Executive Agent. The USD(P) comments noted that an executive agent for FMS already exists. However, DoDD 5106.65 established DSCA as an agency of DoD, not as an "executive agent" of FMS. The Directive further states that the Director, DSCA, shall be appointed by USD(P). As the Director, DSCA is appointed by USD(P), rather than by SECDEF or DEPSECDEF; the Director, DSCA is not an executive agent until and unless so designated by the SECDEF or DEPSECDEF.
- (U) Foreign Military Sales Management Teams. The USD(P) comments discussed the ASD(GSA) Iraq FMS Task Force and the DSCA Integrated Project Team.
- Foreign Military Sales Task Force. According to the July 2007 charter of the Iraq FMS Task Force, the group was to provide recommendations to DEPSECDEF within 30 days of activation on how to substantially improve the procurement and delivery cycle of FMS procured defense articles and services supporting Iraq. No clear end-state objective was established for the existence of the Task Force, although the goal of halving the time required to process FMS cases from Letter of Request to Letter of Offer and Acceptance was mentioned. The core Task Force is currently comprised of members from USD(P), USD(AT&L), the Joint Staff, and DSCA. This is apparently an additional duty for the members. The Task Force as currently organized does not represent the permanence, breadth, or authority we believe is necessary to meet the priority challenge of managing and coordinating the Foreign Military Sales to support the war-time equipping and training requirements of U.S. commanders and ISF.
- (U) Defense Security Cooperation Agency Integrated Project Team. The Integrated Project Team does not currently have a charter, goals, objectives, standards, completed membership, or other written direction, and is an additional

duty for the members. The Integrated Process Team as currently organized does not represent the permanence, breadth, or authority we believe is necessary to drive the FMS program until it can provide the responsive wartime support that is currently demanded.

- (U) Executive Agent and Joint Program Management Office. The management of FMS programs is challenging and complicated in a peacetime environment. However, those tasks are exceedingly more difficult in a war-time situation, particularly one that requires an urgent responsiveness to the requirements of U.S. commanders establishing and maintaining the combat readiness of ISF. As stated in this report, the FMS program needs to be fully supportive of the war-time equipping and training requirements of U.S. commanders in support of the ISF. Once the SECDEF, DEPSECDEF, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are satisfied that the program is performing to their expectations, the JPMO would be disestablished.
- (U) The Task Force and its participating organizations have made improvements in case processing and delivery response times. However, we continue to believe that the FMS program has not yet demonstrated that it can fully meet the standard of U.S. commanders and Iraqi government to urgently build and sustain the training and equipping of the Iraq Security Forces. Therefore, we maintain that a DoD Executive Agent as a Joint Program Management Office is still required to accomplish this mission until the desired standards are met.
- (U) For example, the Iraq FMS Task Force identified in an attachment to its charter certain Iraq FMS bottlenecks. Notable among them, applying to the United States, are that "no one organization [is] accountable," "lack of in-country personnel with appropriate experience," "competition for scarce material resources-industrial capacity," "diversion," and "transportation." These bottlenecks are the problems we envision that a Joint Program Management Office/DoD Executive Agent would address and work to resolve for the war-time FMS process supporting Iraq. The Joint Program Management Office would be a unifying, integrating organization in support of USCENTCOM, MNF-I, and MNSTC-I. It would not alter the current organizations supporting FMS.
- (U) After considering all of management's comments, we still recommend that consideration be given to appointing an Executive Agent according to provisions of DoDD 5101.1, specifically, paragraphs 4.1 and 4.1.1, which state that the DoD Executive Agent designation shall be conferred when no existing means to accomplish DoD objectives exists. We believe that a security assistance community organized over decades to operate in a generally peacetime environment may not be fully effective in a war-time situation and, therefore, not be able to provide the timely response required to accomplish DoD objectives in this area. The security assistance community does not currently possess a single entity with the management permanence, breadth, or authority necessary to energize both security assistance organizations and DoD non- security assistance organizations (e.g. contracting, procurement, and transportation organizations) and integrate them into a fully coordinated, effective, and responsive DoD team to meet the war-time equipping and training requirements of U.S. commanders in Iraq as they support ISF to become fully operational and independent.

- (U) Further, we believe that an organization, such as a Joint Program Management Office, led by a senior General Officer or Senior Executive Service Officer, dedicated solely to the war-time FMS process (including the assigned personnel), is the best solution for removing the bottlenecks that exist in the United States for the support of the Iraq FMS program. Further, although Afghanistan was not discussed in this report, a Joint Program Management Office (JPMO) supporting (pseudo) FMS operations there would also address similar problems that exist in the FMS process supporting the Afghan National Security Forces. As such, the JPMO could become the means to address how a peacetime organization and process can meet the train, equip, and sustain requirements of a combatant command and assist a host nation in building combat ready security forces during the war-time situations that we now face in Iraq and Afghanistan.
- (U) Funding for a Joint Program Management Office. The USD(P) response states that the establishment of a U.S.-based Joint Program Management Office to implement integration and coordination of a country's FMS program would, in general, need to be requested and funded by the government of that country. We disagree with this response for several reasons.
- (U) For example, the Iraq FMS Task Force was established to provide recommendations on how to substantially improve the procurement and delivery cycle of FMS procured defense articles and services supporting Iraq. To the best of our knowledge, host nation support funds were not requested for this mission, which was supported by DoD appropriated funds. Further, there appears to be no legal or statutory basis for any DoD program management office, such as a Joint Program Management Office, to be funded by a foreign nation. Moreover, a foreign government should not be permitted to influence a DoD program management office by funding it.
- (U) The Joint Program Management Office would serve as a central point of contact for the coordination and integration of U.S.-based organizations providing support for the FMS and pseudo FMS processes used to train and equip ISF. The mission of the Joint Program Management Office would be to independently oversee, trouble-shoot, resolve problems, and eliminate bottlenecks in providing flexible and responsive security assistance support to Iraq.
- (U) In conclusion, the only intent for establishing this office is to improve support to the field so ISF can become fully combat ready and able to plan, conduct, and sustain independent combat operations at the earliest possible date.
- (U) Because we believe that the success of the FMS program for Iraq is so critical, we recommend that DoD senior management reconsider their nonconcurrence with the proposal to establish an Executive Agent to drive this program and address the areas that still need improvement.
- (U) M.2. We recommend that the Secretary of Defense, with appropriate congressional approval, establish a Defense Coalition Support Account to acquire a pool of high priority, high demand, urgently needed equipment that will be immediately available for shipment to the Iraq Security Forces to expand forces,

modernize forces, and replace combat losses.

- (U) Management Comments to Recommendation M.2. USD(P) concurred, stating that DoD included the establishment of a Defense Coalition Support Account in its package of legislative proposals, which is currently pending Congressional action.
- (U) Assessment Response. The management comments meet the intent of Recommendation M.2.
- (U) M.3. We recommend that the Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq establish and approve authorized positions for the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq security assistance office in the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq Joint Manning Document that provides sufficient personnel with the requisite skills and experience levels to successfully execute its security assistance mission.
- (U) Management Comments to recommendation M.3. MNF-I concurred, noting that MNSTC-I J1, with support from MNF-I C1, worked extensively with USCENTCOM J1 to add 18 positions to the MNSTC-I JMD. These positions were approved in November 2007. Total manning of the security assistance office is currently at approximately 90%; however, officers who have had any FMS experience prior to being assigned to MNSTC-I continue to be a challenge. The Joint Staff J5 continues to be a strong advocate and provides invaluable assistance in identifying experienced personnel to fill these positions.
- (U) Assessment Response. The management comments meet the intent of Recommendation M.3.
- (U) M.4. We recommend that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Commander, U.S. Central Command expedite:
- (U) a. Approval of the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq Joint Manning Document to accomplish the actions cited in Recommendation M.3.
- (U) b. Assignment of personnel with the requisite skills, experience levels, and rank to fill positions designated in the Joint Manning Document for the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq security assistance function.
- (U) Management Comments to Recommendation M.4.
- (U) USCENTCOM concurred, noting that the additional JMD positions for the MNSTC-I Security Assistance Office were forwarded to the Joint Staff on 27 August 2007, and approved by SECDEF on 5 November 2007. The military services are working to fill these new positions with personnel possessing requisite skills and experience levels.

- (U) The Joint staff concurred, noting that the MNSTC-I FMS division has a current manning of 32 of 36 positions. The remaining four billets have Service commitment for sourcing. The Secretary of Defense recently approved five additional billets to support the MNSTC-I division as a Functional Capability Team. These billets will be manned by July 2008. U.S. Joint Forces Command, as the force provider, will ensure that the appropriate Service identifies military/civilian personnel that meet the requisite skills, experience, and rank/rate necessary to meet the requirements.
- (U) Assessment Response. The management comments meet the intent of Recommendation M.4.
- (U) M.5. We recommend that the Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq advise and assist the Iraqi Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior in establishing a requirements planning process that forecasts the Iraq Security Forces equipment and training needs on a multi-year basis to stabilize and improve the responsiveness of the Iraqi Foreign Military Sales program.
- (U) Management comments to Recommendation M.5. MNF-I concurred, noting that MNSTC-I will continue to work with both MoD and MoI to refine their processes for identifying, prioritizing, and resourcing requirements.
- (U) Assessment Response. The management comments meet the intent of Recommendation M.5.

Part V (U) Iraq Security Forces Logistics Capabilities (U)

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Observation N.

Iraq Security Forces Logistics Capabilities (U)

- (U) The ISF logistics system was in the early stages of development; the system was fragile and not capable of totally sustaining independent ISF military operations. MNSTC-I and MNC-I do not have sufficient personnel with the requisite skills and experience levels to carry out their logistics mentoring mission and assist ISF in establishing its logistical sustainment base. Establishing this sustainment capability is a U.S. and Iraqi top priority.
- (U) The expeditious approval of the proposed MNSTC-I JMD and the assignment of personnel with the requisite skills, experience levels, and rank to fill positions for the logistics mentoring functions will greatly enhance ISF efforts to become self sufficient and increasingly take over battle space. This result will greatly reduce the demands on Coalition forces.

Multi-National Force-Iraq Joint Campaign Plan (U)

(U) The revised MNF-I Joint Campaign Plan, November 2007, contains an annex specifically dedicated to resources and sustainment during 2008 and makes logistics a strategic priority. The Joint Campaign Plan focuses on developing and maturing existing ISF logistics functions and processes to be able to purchase, deliver, and maintain end items and services in support of ISF combat units.

Status of Iraq Security Forces Logistics Capabilities (U)


- (U) In its September 14, 2007 report to Congress, "Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq," DoD stated that "Iraqi MoD logistics from tactical to strategic levels, and MoI logistics at the strategic level, are fragile and not capable of independent execution."
- (U) The DoD report further states:

The MoD, and to a lesser extent, the MoI, have shown some improvements in logistics capabilities. The notable exception is an inability to adequately forecast life-support requirements and to promptly take action when contracts are expiring.

The construction of national-level maintenance and warehousing facilities at the Taji National Maintenance and Supply depots should be completed by 2009. Training enough personnel in critical logistics trades to fully staff these depots will take longer.

Both ministries [MoD and MoI] still receive substantial logistics support from the Coalition, mostly in the form of U.S.-funded contracts, but to some degree direct support.

- (U) The report also notes that ISF are partially dependent on Coalition support to move supplies and, at times, to provide fuel for Iraqi vehicles and generators.
- (U) Further, the Commander, MNSTC-I stated during testimony to Congress in January 2008, that ISF have made much progress, but "the truth is that they simply cannot fix, supply, arm, or fuel themselves completely enough at this point." Figure 7 shows U.S. contracted trucks parked at Abu Ghraib Warehouse that are used to transport munitions to the Iraq national munitions depots at Taji National Depot and Baghdad Police College.



(U) Figure 7. Contracted Transport Vehicles Parked at Abu Ghraib Warehouse.

(U) In our opinion, the U.S. forces and contractor support provided the backbone of the Iraqi logistics system. The fragile logistical infrastructure hinders the development of a stronger arms and ammunition accountability and control system. As the size of the ISF expands and the operations tempo picks up, this situation could get worse if we do not improve the Iraqi logistics sustainment capability. We need to expedite assistance to the ISF now.

Resources to Mentor the Iraq Security Forces (U)

- (U) The timely achievement of the Iraqi and MNF-I objective of building Iraq's national logistics sustainment base requires the proper level of experience, skill sets, rank, understanding and mutual respect to assist in training and mentoring ISF logistics' leadership. In this regard, we need to accelerate the arrival of personnel who are properly trained for this mission. They are badly needed.
- (U) U.S. military and police transition teams and senior logistics advisors must

play a key role in assisting ISF in building its logistics sustainment base and its capabilities. These logistics mentors are needed to provide advice and assistance to Iraqi logistics officials in planning, building, and operating their logistics sustainment base.

(U) Achieving logistics sustainment objectives for ISF remains a major challenge and a top strategic priority for the Office of the Secretary of Defense, USCENTCOM, MNF-I, MNC-I, and MNSTC-I. It is a necessary pre-condition for achieving Iraqi self-sufficiency and national security.

Recommendations (U)

(U) N.1. We recommend that the Secretary of Defense appoint a Department of Defense Executive Agent to integrate, coordinate, and expedite the support needed by the U.S. Central Command, the Multi-National Force-Iraq, the Multi-National Corps-Iraq, and the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq as they advise and assist the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior in planning and building their logistics sustainment base for the Iraq Security Forces. The Executive Agent would drive the support needed from the United States to support the U.S. Commanders as they assist the Iraq Security Forces build their ability to conduct totally independent operations and expand their battle space.

(U) Management Comments to Recommendation N.1.

- (U) USD(P) and USD(AT&L) concurred with the importance of developing ISF logistics capabilities, agreeing to explore options and mechanisms to assist the Government of Iraq in that effort. They did not explicitly support or reject the "Executive Agent" proposal.
- (U) Assessment Response. On the basis of the management comments and our assessment of those comments, we continue to believe appointing a DoD Executive Agent is the preferred option to ensure USCENTCOM, MNF-I, MNC-I, and MNSTC-I have the support needed to assist ISF build their capacity to fully support combat operations. MNF-I, MNC-I, and MNSTC-I must have quick reach back capability, through USCENTCOM, to a single operational point of contact so that timely support will be provided to USCENTCOM and MNF-I for developing ISF logistics capacity. The DoD Executive Agent must be available twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week and have this as the only mission. This Executive Agent must be able to expedite assistance in providing (not all-inclusive):
 - (U) mentors with appropriate rank and experience at the national level to work with top leaders in the MoD and MoI;
 - (U) logistics sustainment;
 - (U) acquisition contracting;

- (U) transportation;
- (U) training teams; and
- (U) training for U.S. and Coalition logistics mentors and trainers.
- (U) Therefore, we have not changed the recommendation. In our opinion, an Executive Agent would ensure that MNF-I, MNC-I, and MNSTC-I get the support required to expedite building an Iraqi logistics sustainment base that would become self-sufficient at the earliest possible date.
- (U) Because we believe that the success of the logistics sustainment program for Iraq is so critical and the USD(P) and USD(AT&L) response did not clearly indicate concurrence or nonconcurrence with the Executive Agent proposal, we recommend that senior management reconsider the proposal to establish an Executive Agent to drive this program.
- (U) If USD(P) and USD(AT&L) disagree with recommendation N.1., we ask that they develop and provide options other than appointing an Executive Agent, as they committed to in their response. We request that they coordinate these options with USCENTCOM. We also request this information within 30 days so that we can evaluate the options independently.
- (U) N.2. We recommend that the Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq:
- (U) a. Establish and approve the required positions for senior logistics mentors and military and police transition team logistics mentors in the Multi-National Corps-Iraq and the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq through the Joint Manning Document or Request for Forces processes so as to provide sufficient personnel with the requisite skills and experience levels to successfully execute the logistics mentoring mission.
- (U) b. Ensure that senior logistics mentors and military transition team logistics mentors assigned to Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq via the Joint Manning Document/Request for Forces are further assigned to advise/mentor the appropriate offices in the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Interior, the Iraqi Joint Headquarters, and Iraq Security Forces, as needed.
- (U) c. Establish a logistics training program in Iraq, comparable in comprehensiveness to that currently provided by the Counter-Insurgency Academy, to train U.S. military and police transition team logistics mentors. This could be a block of instruction taught at the Counter Insurgency Academy itself. We need to ensure that logistics mentors/advisors are prepared to perform this critical mission.
- (U) Management Comments to Recommendation N.2.
- (U) MNF-I concurred with N.2.a. and N.2.b, noting that MNSTC-I would determine requirements for logistics mentors needed for the MNC-I and MNSTC-I staffs, and coordinate with MNF-I C1 to ensure requisite skills and experience levels are incorporated in the JMD or RFF, as appropriate.


(U) MNF-I nonconcurred with recommendation N.2.c. They stated that the MNF-I CG directed the establishment of a "Council of Colonels," renamed the Iraqi Logistics Development Committee (ILDC), an initiatives group to develop a way ahead to assist the accelerated growth of the ISF life support, maintenance, and logistics system. The ILDC is represented by all Coalition Force organizations, to include: MNF-I, MNC-I, MNSTC-I, Iraqi Assistance Group (IAG), and Iraqi Ground Forces Command (IGFC) MiTT. Between 15 February and 30 March 2008, the ILDC operational planning team (OPT) met several times to develop an ISF logistics way ahead. The Committee provided several inprogress review briefings to the Deputy Chief of Staff, Resource and Sustainment, MNF-I; the Commander, Iraqi Assistance Group, MNC-I; and the Commander, Coalition Army Advisory Training Team, MNSTC-I. In late March 2008, the initiatives group provided a decision brief to the Commander, MNC-I and Commander, MNSTC-I. The ILDC OPT deliverable product is an MNF-I FRAGO that will establish a common operating picture of ISF logistics capability and capacity, in order to synchronize efforts of all stakeholders responsible for assisting in the development of the ISF logistics system. The FRAGO, to be published in late April/early May 2008, will provide a Logistics Action Plan directing MNF-I and subordinate units to execute effects-based tasks to increase the ISF logistics capability and capacity. ILDC will refine and develop metrics to measure ISF logistics capability and capacity by function across all levels of support in order to establish current capability, target training efforts to close the capability gap, and gauge progress towards ISF self-reliance.

(U) Assessment Response.

- (U) The management comments meet the intent of recommendations N.2.a. and N.2.b.
- (U) After reviewing the management comments regarding recommendation N.2.c, we did not change the recommendation. Our recommendation was made to ensure that logistics trainers and mentors were properly trained for the mission they were assigned. We found some very dedicated trainers and mentors that were not properly prepared for the job they were given. In response to the final report, we ask that MNF-I provide us with a copy of the MNF-I FRAGO that will implement the Logistics Action Plan, as developed by the ILDC OPT. We will review this document to determine if it meets the intent of recommendation N.2.c.
- (U) N.3. We recommend that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Commander, U.S. Central Command expedite:
- (U) a. Approval of the Multi-National Corp-Iraq and the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq Joint Manning Document/Request for Forces and request the necessary funding to accomplish the actions cited in Recommendations N.2.a., N.2.b. and N.2.c.
- (U) b. Assignment of personnel with the requisite skills, experience levels, and rank, to include civilians from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, to fill positions designated in the Joint Manning Document/Request for Forces for

the Multi-National Corps-Iraq and the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq logistics mentoring functions.

- (U) Management Comments to Recommendation N.3.
- (U) USCENTCOM concurred, noting that they will review and validate future requirements for logistics mentors approved by Commander, MNF-I for addition to MNC-I and MNSTC-I JMD/RFF, as appropriate.



- (U) The Joint Staff concurred, noting that overall MNC-I JMD manning is at 95 percent, and MNSTC-I overall manning is also at 95 percent. U.S. Joint Forces Command, as the force provider, will ensure that the appropriate Service identifies military/civilian personnel that meet the requisite skills, experience, and rank/rate necessary to meet the requirements.
- (U) Assessment Response. The management comments meet the intent of Recommendation N.3.

Appendix A. Scope and Methodology (U)

- (U) The Secretary of Defense and the Congress became concerned about the accountability and control of U.S. weapons and ammunition (arms and ammunition) provided to the security forces of Iraq (the army and police). These concerns grew out of a Hotline complaint, followed by Defense Criminal Investigative Service and U.S. Army Criminal Investigative Division investigations.
- (U) In addition, the Government Accountability Office and Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction issued audit reports that identified problems with the oversight of weapons being provided to the Iraq Security Forces. Subsequently, the Secretary of Defense and Congress requested that the DoD Inspector General review the current state of arms and ammunition accountability and control in Iraq.
- (U) We made survey visits of approximately one week each to Afghanistan and Kuwait to gain a theater-wide perspective of the arms and ammunition accountability and control situation in Southwest Asia, which is the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility. We identified issues in Afghanistan that we did not fully address during this effort but which merit follow-up.
- (U) We examined accountability and control policies and procedures for arms and ammunition in Iraq that were currently in place at the time of our assessment. The scope of our assessment in Iraq applied to two areas:
 - U.S.-purchased and otherwise obtained arms and ammunition that were under DoD control before DoD formal handover to the Iraq Security Forces (ISF). Specifically, this included arms and ammunition from the time of arrival at selected Iraq ports of entry until formal handover to ISF.
 - U.S.-purchased and otherwise obtained arms and ammunition that were under ISF control after DoD formal handover to ISF. Specifically, this included arms and ammunition from the time of formal handover to ISF by DoD organizations through the subsequent issuance to selected ISF military and police units.
- (U) We examined the delivery processes for U.S.-controlled arms and ammunition flowing to Iraqi military forces at the Taji National Depot and to Iraqi police forces at the Baghdad Police College for those arms and ammunition delivered through the port of entry at the Baghdad International Airport. We examined the process that ISF used to issue weapons to individual soldiers and police and the delivery process by which the ISF distributed arms and ammunition through subsequent issuance to selected ISF military and police units.
- (U) We reviewed United States Code; DoD Directives, Instructions, Regulations, and Manuals; and Army Regulations applicable to the management of arms and ammunition, Foreign Military Sales, and logistics.
- (U) The Arms and Ammunition Assessment Team chronology was:

(U) June – July 2007	Briefed DoD and Department of State leadership and Congressional Committees	
(U) July 2007	DoD Arms and Ammunition Assessment Team established	
(U) September – October 2007	Trip to Kuwait, Afghanistan, and Iraq	
(U) November 2007	Briefed the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff	
(U) December 2007	Briefed Congressional Committees	
(U) December 2007- March 2008	Report writing	
(U) March 2008	Draft assessment report issued	
(U) April 2008	Management comments received and evaluated	
(U) April-May 2008	DoD Arms and Ammunition Assessment Team Followup Trip to Iraq	

Appendix B. Summary of Prior Coverage (U)

(U) During the last 5 years, the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), and the Department of Defense Inspector General (DoD IG) have issued four reports and testimony discussing the accountability and control over arms and ammunition and other equipment provided to the Iraq Security Forces. Unrestricted GAO reports can be accessed over the Internet at http://www.gao.gov. Unrestricted SIGIR reports can be accessed over the Internet at http://www.sigir.mil. Unrestricted DoD IG reports can be accessed at or at http://www.dodig.mil/inspections/ie/reports or at http://www.dodig.mil/inspections/ie/reports

GAO (U)

- (U) GAO Report No. GAO-07-711, "STABILIZING IRAQ: DOD Cannot Ensure That U.S.-Funded Equipment Has Reached Iraqi Security Forces," July 2007
- (U) GAO Report No. GAO-07-582T, "OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM: Preliminary Observations on Iraqi Security Forces' Logistical Capabilities," March 2007
- (U) GAO Report No. GAO-07-308SP, "SECURING, STABILIZING, AND REBUILDING IRAQ: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight," January 2007

SIGIR (U)

(U) SIGIR Report No. SIGIR-06-033, "Iraqi Security Forces: Weapons Provided By the U.S. Department of Defense Using the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund," October 2006

DoD IG (U)

- (U) DoD IG Report No. D-2008-026, "Management of the Iraq Security Forces Fund in Southwest Asia Phase III," November 2007
- (U) DoD IG Report No. IE-2005-002, "Interagency Assessment of Iraq Police Training," July 2005 (the Department of State Office of Inspector General participated in this assessment and issued Report No. ISP-IQO-05-72)
- (U) Summary of DoD IG Report No. D-2008-026. This report showed that:
 - (U) The Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) was not always able to demonstrate proper accountability for and management of ISFF purchases and could not always demonstrate that the delivery of services, equipment, and construction was properly made to the Iraq Security Forces (ISF).
 - (U) This occurred because MNSTC-I did not have sufficient controls and procedures in place, did not maintain adequate oversight, and did not maintain accountable property records. In addition, MNSTC-I did not have adequate

- resources for efficient management of services, equipment, and construction purchased through the ISFF.
- (U) As a result, MNSTC-I was unable to provide reasonable assurance that funds appropriated for ISF achieved the intended results, that resources were used in a manner consistent with the mission, and that resources were protected from waste and mismanagement.
- (U) Summary of Government Accountability Office Report No. GAO-07-711.
- (U) This report showed that:
 - (U) DoD and Multi-National Force (MNF-I) had not specified which DoD accountability procedures, if any, applied to the train and equip program for Iraq as of July 2007.
 - (U) The MNF-I did not have orders that comprehensively specified accountability procedures for equipment distributed to the Iraq Security Forces as of July 2007.
 - (U) DoD and MNF-I could not fully account for Iraq Security Forces' receipt of U.S.-funded equipment.
 - (U) A discrepancy of at least 190,000 weapons existed between data reported by the former MNSTC-I commander and MNSTC-I property books.
- (U) Summary of Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Report No. SIGIR-06-033.
- (U) This report showed that:
 - (U) Twelve types of small arms (a total of 370,251 weapons) had been purchased for ISF, using Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) funds, through 19 contracts issued as of April 26, 2005. The report also showed that 12 types of small arms (a total of 134,842 weapons) had been procured using funding sources other than IRRF for a total of 505,093 weapons issued and warehoused (pending issue) as of September 4, 2006.
 - (U) Weapons accountability was questionable in two property books maintained by MNSTC-I for the Iraqi Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the Ministry of Interior (MoI). The property books did not show a combined inventory quantity of sufficient numbers to account for the three types of weapons procured for ISF using IRRF funds. IRRF funds were used to purchase 178,135 of the 3 types of weapons but the two property books totals showed only 164,105 on record, a variance of 14,030 weapons or about 7.9 percent. ¹⁶

¹⁵ (U) The report noted that this is the total issued and on-hand quantity (pending issue) as reflected in the two MNSTC-I maintained property books as of September 4, 2006.

¹⁶ (U) The report noted that the combined quantity of these three items from the two MNSTC-I maintained property books could reasonably be expected to also include weapons from a variety of sources; such as weapons donated, captured, and purchased with funds other than IRRF.

• (U) Serial numbers were not always registered in the DoD Registry of the Small Arms Serialization Program for the weapons purchased by DoD and provided to ISF. Only 2 of the 19 IRRF-funded contracts contained requirements specifying that the contractor provide weapons serial numbers for the DoD Small Arms Serialization Program. The report noted that this information suggested that only 10,000 of the 370,251 IRRF-funded weapons, or about 2.7 percent, may have been recorded in the DoD Registry. The MNSTC-I property books contained serial numbers for only 12,128 of the total 505,093 weapons issued and warehoused or about 2 percent of the weapons provided. 17

¹⁷ (U) The report noted that this is the total issued and on-hand quantity (pending issue) as reflected in the two MNSTC-I maintained property books as of September 4, 2006. The property books reflect all weapons, regardless of funding source, and the counts were not exclusive to IRRF-procured weapons.

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Appendix C. Glossary (U)

- (U) This appendix provides definitions of terms used in this report.
- (U) Arms and Ammunition Joint Publication 1-02 states that arms and ammunition, in common usage, can be military weapons, ammunition, and equipment. For purposes of this report, the term arms and ammunition is used to mean weapons (small arms) and ammunition.
- (U) Accountability DoD Instruction (DoDI) 5000.64, "Accountability and Management of DoD-Owned Equipment and Other Accountable Property," November 2, 2006, states accountability is the obligation imposed by law, lawful order, or regulation, accepted by an organization or person for keeping accurate records, to ensure control of property, documents or funds, with or without physical possession. The obligation, in this context, refers to the fiduciary duties, responsibilities, and obligations necessary for protecting the public interest; however, it does not necessarily impose personal liability upon an organization or person.
- (U) Defense Articles Defense articles are defined in 22 U.S.C. 2403(d), (laws in effect as of January 3, 2005) as:
 - any weapon, weapons system, munition, aircraft, vessel, boat or other implement of war;
 - any property, installation, commodity, material, equipment, supply, or goods used for the purposes of furnishing military assistance;
 - any machinery, facility, tool, material supply, or other item necessary for the manufacture, production, processing repair, servicing, storage, construction, transportation, operation, or use of any article listed in this subsection; or
 - any component or part of any article listed in this subsection;
 - but shall not include merchant vessels or, as defined by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2011), source material (except uranium depleted in the isotope 235 which is incorporated in defense articles solely to take advantage of high density or pyrophoric characteristics unrelated to radioactivity), byproduct material, special nuclear material, production facilities, utilization facilities, or atomic weapons or articles involving Restricted Data.
- (U) Force Multiplier Joint Publication 1-02, "DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms," as amended through October 17, 2007, states that a force multiplier is a capability that, when added to and employed by a combat force, significantly increases the combat potential of that force and thus enhances the probability of successful mission accomplishment.
- (U) Logistics Joint Publication 1-02 states logistics is the science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces. In its most comprehensive sense, those aspects of military operations that deal with:
 - a. design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution,

maintenance, evacuation, and disposition of materiel;

- b. movement, evacuation, and hospitalization of personnel;
- c. acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities; and
 - d. acquisition or furnishing of services.
- (U) Security Assistance DoD 5105.38-M, "Security Assistance Management Manual," October 3, 2003, states that Security Assistance is a group of programs, authorized by law, which allows the transfer of military articles and services to friendly foreign Governments. Security Assistance transfers may be carried out via sales, grants, leases, or loans and are authorized under the premise that if these transfers are essential to the security and economic well-being of allied Governments and international organizations, they are equally vital to the security and economic well-being of the U.S. Security Assistance programs support U.S. national security and foreign policy objectives. They increase the ability of our friends and allies to deter and defend against possible aggression, promote the sharing of common defense burdens, and help foster regional stability.
- (U) Sensitive Items DoD 4100.39-M, "Federal Logistics Information System," Volume 10, Table 61, November 2007, states that sensitive items are materiel which requires a high degree of protection and control due to statutory requirements or regulations. It includes, for example, items that are of high value; highly technical or of a hazardous nature; and small arms, ammunition, explosives, and demolition material.
- (U) Small Arms Joint Publication 1-02, defines small arms as man portable, individual, and crew-served weapon systems used mainly against personnel and lightly armored or unarmored equipment.
- (U) Small Arms Serialization Program DoD 4000.25-2-M, "Military Standard Transaction Reporting and Accounting Procedures," September 2001, Chapter 12, "Small Arms Serial Number Registration and Reporting," Change 5, January 2006, states that one of several objectives of the serial number registration and reporting program is to establish continuous visibility over all small arms by serial number from the contractor to depot; in storage; in-transit to requisitioners; in post, camp, and station custody; in the hands of users; during turn-ins; in renovation; and during disposal/demilitarization. Another objective is to provide law enforcement or investigative agencies with the identification of the last accountable activity having specific serial numbered weapons when those weapons are found to be missing or stolen.

Appendix D. Organizations Contacted and Visited (U)

(U) We visited, contacted, or conducted interviews with officials (or former officials) from the following U.S. and Iraqi organizations:

United States (U)

(U) Department of State

- The Secretary of State
- The U.S. Ambassador to Iraq and officials assigned to the U.S. Embassy Iraq
- The Deputy Chief of Mission to Afghanistan and officials assigned to the U.S. Embassy Afghanistan
- The Inspector General, Department of State and officials assigned to the Department of State, Office of the Inspector General

(U) Department of Defense

- The Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary of Defense
- The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
- The Director, Joint Staff
- The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
- The Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)
- The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and members of his staff

(U) Department of the Army

- The Secretary of the Army
- The Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Army
- The Commander, U.S. Army Materiel Command
- Officials assigned to the U.S. Army Materiel Command
- Officials assigned to the U.S. Army Joint Arms and Ammunition Command

- Officials assigned to the U.S. Army Materiel Command Logistics Support Activity
- Officials assigned to the U.S. Army Security Assistance Command
- Officials assigned to the U.S. Army TACOM and Life Cycle Management Command

(U) U.S. Central Command

- The Commander, U.S. Central Command, the Deputy Commander, U.S. Central Command, and key senior staff members
- The Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq and key staff members
- The Commander, Multi-National Corps-Iraq and key staff members
- The Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (to include the Civilian Police Assistance Training Team and the Coalition Military Assistance Training Team [now the Coalition Air Force Transition Team and the Coalition Army Advisory Transition Team]) and key staff members
- The Commander, Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan and key staff members
- The Commander, Gulf Region Division, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (to include the Logistics Movement Coordination Center) and key staff members
- Training Team to 2nd Brigade, 5th Battalion, National Police

(U) Defense Agencies

• (U) The Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency and officials assigned to the Defense Security Cooperation Agency

Government of Iraq (U)

(U) Ministry of Defense

- Chief of Iraqi Joint Staff
- Vice Chairman Iraqi Joint Staff
- Iraqi Ground Forces Commander
- Inspector General
- Former Deputy Commander for Support
- Iraqi Army Units

- 2nd Battalion, 2nd Brigade, 1st Division
- Headquarters Support Company, 3rd Division
- Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 4th Brigade, 9th Division
- 1st Company, Base Defense Battalion, Taji
- Regional Support Units (now known as Base Support Units)
 - Al Kasik
 - Habbaniyah
 - Numaniyah
 - Taji

(U) Ministry of Interior

- Minister of Interior
- Director General for Logistics
- Provincial Director of Police Ninawa Province
- Provincial Police Chief of Logistics Ninawa Province
- Deputy Inspector General
- Iraqi Police Units
 - National Police, Director of Logistics
 - Mosul Special Police Unit

(U) Ministry of Health

- Inspector General
- (U) Iraqi Inspector General Association

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Appendix E. Management Comments (U)



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OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 3000 DEFENSE PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3000

APR 3 0 2008

The Honorable Claude M. Kicklighter Department of Defense Inspector General 400 Army Navy Drive Arlington, VA 22202-4702

Dear Mr. Kicklighter:

As requested, this letter is in response to recommendations contained in Part I (A), Part IV (M), and Part V (N) of the Department of Defense Inspector General (DoD IG) draft report Assessment of the Accountability of Munitions Provided to the Security Forces of Iraq.

As the report itself notes, since the data collection period of this report concluded in October 2007, many steps have been taken to improve the processes and procedures utilized to train, equip, and mentor the Iraqi Security Forces.

Recommendation A: DoD IG recommends the issuance of a letter to clarify that DoD Instruction 5000.64 governs the accountability and control and DoD Instruction 5100.76 governs the physical security of munitions under U.S. control from the point of entry into the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility until formal handover to the Iraq Security Forces or as appropriate to other national partners within the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility.


USD(P)/USD(AT&L/I.&MR)/USDI Response: Concur. The Office of the Secretary of Defense will issue a statement clarifying the applicability of DoD Instruction 5000.64 and DoD Instruction 5100.76.

Recommendation M (1): DoD IG recommends the Secretary of Defense appoint a DoD Executive Agent for the Iraqi FMS program to:

- Improve program performance and to ensure the responsive delivery of equipment, including munitions, in support of the train and equip mission in Irag.
- Establish a U.S.-based Joint Program Management Office to implement integration and coordination of the Iraqi FMS program, increase the responsiveness of the support effort, and meet the wartime requirements of U.S. commanders and ISF. It is critical that the Joint Program Management Office be established now.



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Recommendation N: DoD IG recommends the Secretary of Defense appoint a DoD Executive Agent to expedite support to USCENTCOM, MNF-I and MNSTC-I to advise and assist MOD and MOI in planning and building their logistics sustainment base for the Iraq Security Forces.

AT&L/L&MR Response: partially concur - DOD recognizes the importance of the observations regarding the development of the Iraqi Security Forces logistics capabilities. DOD will explore options to further assist - and if possible, accelerate - the Government of Iraq in developing and improving its logistics, acquisition, and sustainment capabilities.

Gary J. Motsek Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Program Support)

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OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 2900 DEFENSE PENTAGON WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-2800

LOBAL SECURIT

The Honorable Claude M. Kicklighter Department of Defense Inspector General 400 Army Navy Drive Arlington, VA 22202-4702 MAY - 5 2008

Dear Mr. Kicklighter:

As requested, this letter responds to the recommendations contained in Part I (A), Part IV (M), and Part V (N) of the Department of Defense Inspector General (DoD IG) draft report, Assessment of the Accountability of Munitions Provided to the Security Forces of Iraq.

As the report notes, since the data collection period of this report concluded in October 2007, many steps have been taken to improve the processes and procedures utilized to train, equip, and mentor the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF).

Recommendation A: The DoD IG recommends issuing a letter to clarify that DoD Instruction 5000.64 governs the accountability and control and DoD Instruction 5100.76 governs the physical security of munitions under U.S. control from the point of entry into the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility until formal handover to the Iraq Security Forces, or, as appropriate, to other national partners within the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility.

USD(P)/USD(AT&L/L&MR) Response: We concur. The Office of the Secretary of Defense will issue a statement clarifying the applicability of DoD Instruction 5000.64 and DoD Instruction 5100.76.

Recommendation M (1): The DoD IG recommends that the Secretary of Defense appoint a DoD Executive Agent for the Iraqi Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program to:


- Improve program performance and to ensure the responsive delivery of equipment, including munitions, in support of the train and equip mission in Iraq.
- Establish a U.S.-based Joint Program Management Office to implement integration and coordination of the Iraqi FMS program, increase the responsiveness of the support effort, and meet the wartime requirements




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of U.S. commanders and the Iraqi Security Forces. It is critical that the Joint Program Management Office be established <u>now</u>.







Recommendation M (2): The Secretary of Defense, with appropriate congressional approval, establish a Defense Coalition Support Account to acquire a pool of critically needed equipment that will be immediately available for shipment to the Iraqi Security Forces to expand forces, modernize forces, and replace combat losses.

USD(P) Response: We concur. The Department of Defense included the establishment of a Defense Coalition Support Account in its package of legislative proposals, which is currently pending Congressional action.

Recommendation N: The DoD IG recommends that the Secretary of Defense appoint a DoD Executive Agent to expedite support to USCENTCOM, MNF-I,

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and MNSTC-I to advise and assist the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior in planning and building their logistics sustainment base for the Iraq Security Forces.

USD(P)/USD(AT&L/L&MR) Response: The Office of the Secretary of Defense concurs with the importance of the observations regarding the development of Iraqi Security Forces logistics capabilities and will explore options and mechanisms to assist the Government of Iraq in improving its logistics capabilities.

Joseph A. Benkert

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense

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UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 8000 DEFENSE PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-5000

APR 3 0 2008

MEMORANDUM FOR INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Draft Report: Department of Defense Inspector General (DoD IG)
Assessment of the Accountability of Munitions Provided to the Security
Forces of Iraq (Project No. D2007-D000IG-0239.000)

In response to the Recommendation for Observation A made to the Secretary of Defense in the DoD IG draft report, dated March 18, 2008, "Assessment of the Accountability of Munitions Provided to the Security Forces of Iraq, I provide the following:

Recommendation for Observation A: The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence issue a letter to clarify that DoD Instruction 5000.64 governs the accountability and control and DoD Instruction 5100.76 governs the physical security of munitions under U.S. control from the point of entry into the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility until formal handover to the Iraqi Security Forces or as appropriate to other national partners within the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility.


<u>USD(I) Response</u>: I concur with the DoD IG Recommendation for Observation A. My staff will prepare a memorandum to reiterate and clarify that DoD Instruction 5100.76 is applicable for any arms, ammunition, and explosives that are in the possession or the custody of a DoD component. The memorandum will also reiterate the provisions of DoD 5200.8-R, Physical Security Program, which governs minimum physical security standards.

In addition, editorial comments to the report are provided for your consideration. My point of contact is at (703) 604 or @osd.mil.

James R. Clapper, Jr.

Attachment: As stated







THE JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON, DC

Reply ZIP Code: 20318-0300 DJSM-0510-08 27 May 2008

MEMORANDUM FOR THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Subject: Response to Report on the Assessment of the Accountability of Munitions Provided to the Security Forces of Iraq (Project No D2007-D000IG-0239.000)

- 1. Thank your for the opportunity to review the subject report. The Joint Staff responses to the IG recommendations are provided below:
- a. Recommendation L.2.a and L.2.b: Recommends expediting the staffing of the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) Joint Manning Document (JMD). The Joint Staff actively pursues the staffing of all JMDs that have been validated and forwarded by combatant commands. The MNSTC-I requested and USCENTCOM validated requirements articulate the specific skill sets and experience levels required. These requirements are provided to the Services to determine ability to source. Overall MNSTC-I manning is at 95 percent. As a sub-set of this manning, their Individual Augment billets show a Service commitment to sourcing of 94 percent. USJFCOM, as the joint force provider, ensures that the assigned force-providing Service identifies military/civilian personnel that meet the requisite skills, experience, and ranks/rate necessary to meet the requirements. There are numerous situations in which demand for a given skill set exceeds available supply. In these areas, prioritization of available assets and resources weigh heavily in the decision making process.
- b. Recommendation M.4.a. and M.4.b: Recommends expediting staffing of the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) portion of the MNSTC-I JMD. The Joint Staff continues to source and staff all combatant command -validated and -forwarded requirements. The MNSTC-I FMS division has a current manning of 32 of 36 positions. The remaining four billets have Service commitment for sourcing. An additional five billets, to support the MNSTC-I FMS division as a Functional Capability Team, were recently approved for sourcing by the Secretary of Defense and will be manned in positions in theater by 1 Jul 08. USJFCOM, as the joint force provider, ensures that the assigned force-providing Service identifies military/civilian personnel that meet the requisite

skills, experience, and ranks/rate necessary to meet the requirements. As stated above, prioritization is a critical element in the sourcing process.

- c. Recommendation N.3.a. and N.3.b: Recommends expediting staffing of the Multi-National Command Iraq (MNC-I) and MNSTC-I JMDs. The Joint Staff continues to source and staff all combatant command -validated and -forwarded requirements. The overall MNC-I JMD manning is 95 percent, and MNSTC-I overall manning is 95 percent. USJFCOM, as the joint force provider, ensures that the assigned force-providing Service identifies military/civilian personnel that meet the requisite skills, experience, and ranks/rate necessary to meet the requirements.
- 2. Your continued support and the efforts shown in this report are appreciated and will have an impact on the future ability of the U.S. military to continue to conduct these vital missions.

STEPHEN M. GOLDFEIN Major General, USAF Vice Director, Joint Staff

Reference:

1 IG, DOD memorandum, 18 March 2008, "Report on the Assessment of the Accountability of Munitions Provided to the Security Forces of Iraq (Project No. D2007-D000IG-0239.000) (U)"



UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF 7115 SOUTH BOUNDARY BOULEVARD MACDILL AIR FORCE BASE, FLORIDA 33621-5101

28 April 2008

FOR: OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: United States Central Command Response to Draft Report, "Assessment of the Accountability of Munitions Provided to the Security Forces of Iraq," dated 18 March 2008

- 1. Thank you for the opportunity to respond to the recommendations presented in the draft report.
- 2. Attached are the United States Central Command consolidated comments, incorporating the responses from Multi-National Force Iraq, Multi-National Corps Iraq, and Multi-National Security Transition Command Iraq.

3. The Point of Contact is

, USCENTCOM Inspector General,

J. W. MILLER

Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy

Enclosure As Stated

UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND (USCENTCOM)
MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE, IRAQ (MNF-I)
CONSOLIDATED COMMAND COMMENTS
DODIG DRAFT REPORT (MARCH 18, 2008)
PROJECT NO. D2007-D000IG-0239.000

"Assessment of the Accountability of Munitions Provided to the Security Forces of Iraq"

Part I - DoD and Iraq Security Forces Policy and Procedures: Observations and Recommendations (U)

- (U) Observation A. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence had not clarified the applicability of existing DoD policy regarding accountability and control of U.S.-supplied munitions to ISF.
- (U) Recommendation for Observation A. Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, issue a letter to clarify that DoD Instruction 5000.64 governs the accountability and control and DoD Instruction 5100.76 governs the physical security of munitions under U.S. control from the point of entry into the USCENTCOM area of responsibility until formal handover to the ISF or as appropriate to other national partners within the USCENTCOM area of responsibility.

(U) Observation B.

- (U) USCENTCOM, MNF-I, the Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I), and MNSTC-I had not issued written guidance for the accountability and control of munitions delivered to or transported through the USCENTCOM area of responsibility and subsequently provided to ISF or Coalition partners.
- (U) MNF-I had not issued uniform policy to coordinate the efforts of MNC-I and MNSTC-I for the accountability and control of munitions delivered to or transported through Iraq.
- (U) Recommendations for Observation B.
- (U) USCENTCOM issue formal procedures governing the accountability and control of munitions under U.S. control from the point of entry into and transport through the USCENTCOM area of responsibility until formal handover to ISF or as appropriate to other national partners within the USCENTCOM area of responsibility.

CENTCOM RESPONSE: Concur. The Director of Logistics, USCENTCOM is

drafting formal guidance, proposed for publication not later than 1 June 2008.

(U) MNF-I issue formal procedures to govern and coordinate the efforts of its subordinate organizations to account for and control munitions under U.S. control from the point of entry into and transport through Iraq until formal handover to ISF or as appropriate to other national partners in Iraq.

MNF-I RESPONSE: Concur.

- (U) MNSTC-I is in the final stages of publishing a Logistics Accountability SOP. The SOP provides specific direction for accountability and control of sensitive items (including munitions) during: POD operations, intra-theatre distribution and warehouse operations. The SOP is in coordination and is expected to be approved and released by the MNSTC-I CG NLT 30 April 2008.
- (U) Observation C. MNF-I had not clearly defined procedures for the accountability, control, and final disposition of weapons captured by U.S. forces, to include recording captured weapons serial numbers, and had not issued uniform procedures to coordinate the efforts of MNC-I and MNSTC-I for the captured weapons.

(U) Recommendations for Observation C.

(U) MNF-I issue formal procedures to govern the accountability, control, and final disposition of weapons captured by U.S. forces and to coordinate the efforts of MNC-I and MNSTC-I in processing weapons captured by U.S. forces.

- (U) In coordination with MNF-I and MNSTC-I, MNC-I published FRAGO 085 (Tab A) on 24 JAN 08. This FRAGO was designed to coordinate the transfer of captured enemy weapons (CEW) in a controlled and recorded manner between Coalition Forces and Iraq Security Forces. This FRAGO received concurrence from MNF-I and MNSTC-I and modifications are now being coordinated to refine the FRAGOs language with respect to weapon categories, serial # requirements, and transfer process flow.
- (U) MoD/LTG Abdulla (DCOS LOG) concurs with MNC-I procedures that are in place. MoI/MG Adbul Ameer (Asst Deputy Minister for Infrastructure) has verbally committed to MNC-I procedures as well. The two ministries are drafting policies that will compliment MNC-I's FRAGO.
- (U) Observation D. MNF-I had not issued procedures on the missions, roles, and responsibilities applicable to U.S. transition teams and senior advisors involved in advising and assisting MOD, MOI, and subordinate ISF organizations or to coordinate the efforts of MNC-I and MNSTC-I transition teams to support the ISF in its efforts to

account for and control U.S.-supplied or Iraqi-procured munitions.

(U) Recommendations for Observation D. MNF-I issue formal procedures on the missions, roles, and responsibilities applicable to U.S. transition teams and senior advisors involved in advising and assisting MOD, MOI, and subordinate ISF organizations and to coordinate the efforts of MNC-I and MNSTC-I transition teams to support ISF in its efforts to account for and control U.S.- supplied or Iraqi-procured munitions.

MNF-I RESPONSE: Concur.

- (U) MNSTC-I is in the final stages of publishing a Logistics Accountability SOP. The SOP provides specific direction for accountability and control of sensitive items (including munitions) during: POD operations, intra-theatre distribution and warehouse operations. The SOP is in coordination and is expected to be approved and released by the MNSTC-I CG NLT 30 April 2008. MNSTC-I will continue to advise and assist the Ministries of Defense and Interior in establishing the proposed accountability procedures in the draft Logistics Accountability SOP.
- (U) MNSTC-I works closely with the MNC-I Military Training Teams (MiTTs) and will continue to ensure that these teams adhere to the accountability procedures developed by MNSTC-I. MNC-I MiTTs are directed to continue submitting the required documentation and images resulting from weapons issued to the Iraqi units.
- (U) Observation E. MOD and MOI had not issued written policies and procedures for military and police national munitions depots and other storage facilities (such as provincial, regional, unit or station levels) for the accountability and control of U.S.-supplied or Iraqi-procured munitions.
- (U) Recommendation for Observation E. MNSTC-I advise and assist MOD and MOI in the preparation and promulgation of formal policies and procedures for military and police national munitions depots and other storage facilities that address the accountability and control of U.S.-supplied or Iraqi-procured munitions.

- (U) The Iraqi procedures for accountability of equipment, including munitions, are given in the "Iraqi Supply Handbook," Chapter 3, Property Accountability Guide. This procedure outlines accountability through the use of the IA Form 249 (Blanjo) and details their procedures. Rather than advising on the creation of an additional policy, it is recommended that efforts be focused on assistance of enforcement of policies already in place.
- (U) JHQ DCoS Logistics has established a committee that will develop procedures for

the accountability of both U.S.-supplied and Iraqi-procured munitions. The initial report of the committee detailed current and future issues related to the tracking of munitions from their arrival at Um Qasr or BIAP. The current procedure involves the Coalition contracted movement of munitions from Um Qasr or BIAP to the National Ammunition Depot (NAD) at Bayji. Contractor personnel conduct receipt inspections of all ammunition and update the NAD master inventory. When munitions are required at one of the five existing Ammunition Supply Points (ASP), MNSTC-I J4 coordinates movement of ammunition to the requesting ASP through Coalition contracted movement. Inventories at existing ASPs are currently managed by Iraqi forces with MiTT oversight. Regular inventory reports are submitted to MNSTC-I J4. The procedures for future ammunition accountability of munitions by MoD are being developed by the committee chaired by the Ammunition Section of Deputy Chief of Staff (DCoS) Logistics.

- (U) Reference memorandum from the Government of Iraq Ministry of Interior, to subordinate units signed by the Assistant Deputy Minister for Administrative Affairs, dated 18 Dec 07, weapons and ammunition must be secured with three locks, each with a key maintained by an officer with a minimum of four years of experience. Monthly inventories are to be conducted. Stiff fines are established for the loss of any weapon or ammunition. Fines are restated in a separate memorandum #47 signed by the Minister of Interior.
- (U) Observation F. MOD and MOI had not issued written policies and procedures for the accountability, control, and disposition of weapons captured by ISF or Coalition forces (weapons captured by U.S. forces that are subsequently turned over to ISF).
- (U) Recommendation for Observation F. MNSTC-I advise and assist MOD and MOI in the preparation and promulgation of formal policies and procedures for the accountability, control, processing, and final disposition of weapons the ISF captures or weapons captured and turned over to the ISF by Coalition forces.


- (U) MNSTC-I is aware of the issue and is advising MoD DCoS Logistics on a directive that is being drafted.
- (U) While the Mol has not provided a written copy of current policy, Mol officials at the provincial and ministerial levels have confirmed the following procedures are in place: If a police unit captures weapons, they must inventory and inspect each weapon by serial number. The inventory is passed to the Ministry of Interior Auditing Department and compared against their weapons databases to determine the source. The capturing unit may request to retain the weapons to fill shortages, or permission to destroy the weapons. The Ministry of Interior Director of Logistics will provide disposition instructions. If the weapons are destroyed, a committee of three senior officers must witness the destruction and provide certification to the Ministry of Interior Logistics Officer.

Part II - DoD and Iraq Security Forces Operations: Observations and Recommendations (U)

(U) Observation G.


- (U) U.S. forces did not always maintain an unbroken chain of custody for the accountability and control of U.S- controlled munitions before formal handover to ISF.
- (U) U.S. munitions were placed temporarily in areas that lacked sufficient physical security to prevent misplacement, loss, or theft or sufficient storage capacity to efficiently process high volume deliveries of munitions shipments.
- (U) U.S. forces and ISF did not always perform joint inventories of U.S.- controlled weapons prior to formal handover to ISF, and serial numbers for weapons were not always recorded.
- (U) Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan contracts for the procurement of weapons did not always contain clauses requiring lists of weapons serial numbers be sent in advance of weapons shipment to Iraq, the delivery of munitions to Iraq through U.S.-controlled ports of entry within Iraq, or that shippers provide enroute visibility to include the arrival dates and times of munitions cargo being delivered to Iraq.

(U) Recommendations for Observation G.



- (U) Tasking to MNSTC-I is forthcoming.
- (U) MNSTC-I, with advice and assistance from MOD and MOI, jointly develop formal procedures for the delivery, joint inventory, and formal handover of U.S.-controlled munitions delivered to ISF.

MNF-I RESPONSE: Concur.





(U) Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan review all its contracts issued to procure and deliver munitions to ensure that clauses are included requiring vendors and shippers: deliver munitions to Iraq through U.S.-controlled ports of entry within Iraq, provide serial number lists electronically in advance of any weapons shipments to Iraq, post serial number lists on the inside and outside of weapons shipping containers, and provide enroute visibility to include the arrival dates and times of munitions cargo being delivered to Iraq.

MNF-I RESPONSE: Concur.



The applicable information included in solicitations and contracts for weapons is shown below:





- (U) Observation H. The process to populate the MNSTC-I centralized database of weapons serial numbers for weapons issued to ISF by U.S. forces lacked internal data input controls.
- (U) Recommendations for Observation H. MNSTC-I install data input quality controls in its centralized database of weapons serial numbers using a trained database programmer, and U.S. Army Materiel Command Logistics Support Activity assist the MNSTC-I with installing data input quality controls in its centralized database to ensure system compatibility.

MNF-I RESPONSE: Concur.

(U) MNSTC-I requested AMC assistance and a visit was conducted in February 2008. The AMC representative identified required corrections and they have been implemented. MNSTC-I is now sourcing a contracted solution for a commercial database to further enhance data integrity and provide continuity.

(U) Observation I.

- (U) The physical count of three Iraqi military weapon types maintained at Taji National Depot did not match the numbers of weapons recorded in the inventory database. In addition, the team was unable to locate all of the three types of weapons in Taji National Depot because of the disorganized manner in which the weapons were physically stored.
- (U) The Baghdad Police College did not have sufficient storage capacity for the anticipated volume of munitions shipments procured through the Iraq Security Forces Fund and FMS.
- (U) Recommendations for Observation I.

(U) MNSTC-I advise and assist MOD in performing a 100 percent inventory that will establish a baseline for Iraqi military weapons and ammunition stored at Taji National Depot. Thereafter, MNSTC-I advise and assist MOD in performing a 10 percent inventory of Iraqi military weapons and ammunition on a monthly basis.

MNF-I RESPONSE: Concur.

- (U) MNSTC-I is conducting a 100% inventory check of all procured weapons (from either Iraq Security Forces Fund [ISFF] or Foreign Military Sales [FMS] funds) held at Taji National Depot ICW the Iraqis. MOD is conducting checks of ammunition at Taji each week and reports stocks on hand to MNSTC-1. A 100% inventory of ammunition has not yet been completed by MNSTC-I personnel. Once weapons are transferred to the ISF, MNSTC-I does not have the manpower required to conduct monthly 10% checks, but will recommend to ISF Commanders that such an inventory be included in their regulations.
- (U) MNSTC-I agrees that Baghdad Police College (BPC) provides inadequate storage capacity for MoI. Accordingly, MNSTC-I has undertaken an initiative ICW GRD to embed a MoI property team at Abu Ghraib Warehouse (AGW) in an effort to speed direct delivery from AGW to MoI units. Additionally, MNSTC-I recently approved a facilities project for a National Police Sustainment Brigade. These facilities will include warehouse space for NP supplies and commodities thereby reducing the storage requirements at BPC.
- (U) MNSTC-I advise and assist MOD in establishing effective warehouse management and organization processes at Taji National Depot for the storage of weapons and ammunition and requesting help from U.S.-based logistics organizations as needed.

MNF-I RESPONSE: Concur.

(U) MNSTC-I has directed the serial number inventories of weapons and sensitive items in order to transfer the inventory to the Iraqis. A 100 percent serial number joint inventory of weapons will be conducted upon receipt at Taji National Depot at the time of transfer to the Iraqis. New warehouse construction projects with anticipated completion dates in late September 2008 will enhance the ability of the Iraqis to better manage the inventory and storage of weapons and sensitive items Coalition Army Advisory Training Team (CAATT) is focusing on the mentoring of the Taji National Supply Depot leadership to effectively manage warehouse operations, stock control procedures and inventory management. The goal is to have the Iraqis accurately receive, store, and inventory stocks. Additionally, the Iraqis must also manage the workload to pick, pack and ship stocks to the Locations Commands and the ISF. The Logistics Management Advisory Team (LMAT) will over watch the progress of the Iraqis in these areas to enable the Iraqis to execute supply depot operations. Throughout this process, it must be realized that the end state is successful transition to MOD control. The route map

to this end state includes the following measures:

(U) a. The initiation and completion of a 100% joint inventory of weapons and munitions at TND. A MNSTC-I team is on the ground conducting the inventory by


serial number of weapons at TND. The process for issuing weapons from TND has also been addressed to ensure that the correct documentation is completed.

- (U) b. An ammunition storage facility for the MoD Taji Location Command has been built. This is sufficient to handle all the ammunition storage and issue requirements for its dependency. MoD manning of the facility is expected to occur in Jun 08 after students begin graduating from the Ammo Handlers Course offered by the Iraqi Army Service School Institute. The first Ammo Handlers Course is offered on 13 April and the course last five weeks.
- (U) c. A refurbishment program is in place to improve the warehouse storage facilities at TND. MNSTC-I has initiated a contract to provide for shelving/storage at the Taji National Depot. It is expected that this will be awarded before 30 April 08. The development of a Central Receiving and Shipping Point (CRSP) will provide better visibility of equipment and material at TND.
- (U) d. Close liaison with the MOD through the Senior Advisor and the Functional Capabilities Team- Sustainment to DCOS Logistics to:
 - (U) (l) Advise on the development of robust accountability procedures for all sensitive material including weapons and ammunition.
 - (U) (2) Advise MOD personnel at the tactical level-e.g. at TND, of the correct procedures.
 - (U) (3) Effect successful transition to complete MOD control, with minimal CF oversight.
- (U) MNSTC-I advise and assist MOI to construct sufficient capacity for munitions storage at Baghdad Police College and other sites as necessary for the anticipated volume of munitions shipments.


MNF-I RESPONSE: Concur.

(U) The Mol is constrained for storage space for inbound weapons and ammunition and employs a 3-pronged approach to alleviate this problem. The first step is to increase the

rate of throughput to subordinate organizations. The second step is to use temporary container storage in the newly constructed container yard. The third step is to divert ammunition to the Abu Gharib warehouse complex, where Mol is planning on establishing a permanent workforce within the next 60 days. The Coalition is funding the construction of 12K square meters of storage space under a K-span design on Baghdad Police Collage. This project is estimated to be completed by 28 May 2008. Once completed, this will free up all of the hard warehouses for ammunition storage.



MNF-I RESPONSE: Concur.



(U) Observation K.

- (U) Data gathered from U.S. military transition teams supporting four Iraqi Divisions on the accountability of munitions indicated that approximately 85 percent of the Iraqi Army units in those divisions were accounting for weapons by serial number, with plans to attain 100 percent. Further, the MOI started recording serial numbers of weapons issued to police forces in January 2007.
- (U) MNC-I had not issued instructions to all Coalition military transition teams to request the Iraq military and police units they advise to provide weapons serial numbers to MNSTC-I to be recorded in its centralized database of weapons serial numbers.


(U) Recommendations for Observation K.

(U) MNF-I, advise and assist MOD and MOI and their subordinate military and police organizations in attaining and maintaining 100 percent accountability and control of ISF weapons by serial numbers.

MNF-I RESPONSE: Concur.

- (U) MNF-I will continue to direct MNSTC-I to advise and assist MoD and MoI with regard to directing their subordinate organizations to gain and maintain 100% accountability of all weapons by serial number.
- (U) MNC-I instruct all Coalition military transition teams to request the Iraq military and police units they advise to provide weapons serial numbers to MNSTC-I to be recorded in its centralized database of weapons serial numbers.

MNF-I RESPONSE: Nonconcur.





(U) f. Concur with the recommendation that MNSTC-I advisory teams continue to assist the GoI (MoD and MoI) to achieve 100% serial number accountability in their own weapons databases of choice, using the MNSTC-I process as a baseline.

Part III - DoD Personnel Resources: Observations and Recommendations (U)

(U) Observation L. The MNSTC-I J4 (logistics function) did not have sufficient personnel with the requisite skills and experience levels to carry out its mission (including munitions oversight). Further, MNSTC-I program oversight was hindered because the command did not have an Inspector General and had only one internal audit liaison officer.

(U) Recommendations for Observation L.

(U) MNF-I approve a MNSTC-I Joint Manning Document that provides for sufficient numbers of personnel to successfully execute its logistics mission and establish and staffs an Office of Inspector General and an Office of Internal Review.

MNF-I RESPONSE: Concur.


- (U) MNSTC-I completed a comprehensive personnel manning review in the fall of 2007 which resulted in the recommendation to modify the JMD in order to source the requirements shortfalls identified above. In February 2008, GEN Petraeus approved the MSNTC-I JMD change proposal (Tab D). If approved and sourced by the Joint Staff, this JMD change increases overall manning in the MNSTC-I J4 by 46% (an increase from 64 to 94 personnel).
- (U) USCENTCOM and the Joint Staff expeditiously approve the proposed MNSTC-I Joint Manning Document and expedite the assignment of personnel to fill positions designated in Joint Manning Document.

CENTCOM RESPONSE: Concur.

(U) USCENTCOM received the MNF-I out-of-cycle request to modify the MNSTC-I

JMD in March 2008. The proposed JMD was further refined during the USCENTCOM JMD Conference, 9-11 April 2008. In addition to the J4 increases noted by MNF-I, the proposed JMD also reflects a net increase of five personnel within the MNSTC-I Office of the Inspector General, to include an internal review function. USCENTCOM Directors are in the process of validating the MNSTC-I JMD, for submission to the Combatant Commander for approval. We expect to submit an approved document to the Joint Staff not later than 1 June 2008.

Part IV – U.S. Foreign Military Sales: Observations and Recommendations (U)



- (U) Recommendations for Observation M.
- (U) Secretary of Defense appoint a DoD Executive Agent for the Iraqi FMS program to:
- Improve program performance and to ensure the responsive delivery of equipment, including munitions, in support of the train and equip mission in Iraq.

USCENTCOM GENERAL COMMENT:

(U) In August 2007, OSD established an Iraq FMS Task Force to address these concerns, with Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (PDASD) for Global Security Affairs (GSA) as the Task Force lead. The Task Force continues to identify initiatives which have substantially improved the procurement and delivery cycle of FMS-procured defense articles and services supporting Iraq. In February 2008, a U.S-Iraq Security Cooperation Working Group was held in Amman, Jordan to examine ongoing initiatives and discuss methods for greater FMS process improvements with our Iraqi counterparts.

MNF-I GENERAL COMMENT:

- (U) Merits further consideration. The Iraq FMS Task Force, under the direction of the PDASD(GSA), has made some progress towards implementing solid change particularly in the development of a common operating picture which includes in-transit visibility of goods in delivery. Further, both the speed with which goods are delivered and the total manning of the security assistance office has increased. However, although overall personnel strength has grown, only 4 of 21 assigned officers have had any FMS experience prior to being assigned to MNSTC-I. This fact contributes to difficulties which hinder the efficiencies of the FMS program. Another contributing factor is the exponential speed at which the Iraqi FMS program has grown from \$0 in Oct 06 to \$3.2B as of 1 Jan 08. The processing times for turning Letters of Request (LORs) into Letters of Offer and Acceptance (LOAs) by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, as well as getting LOAs staffed and signed within the Iraqi Security Ministries, while improving, need to continue this upward trend.
- Establish a U.S.-based Joint Program Management Office to implement integration and coordination of the Iraqi FMS program, increase the responsiveness of the support effort, and meet the wartime requirements of U.S. commanders and ISF. It is critical that the Joint Program Management Office be established now.

MNF-I GENERAL COMMENT:

- (U) Merits further consideration. The identification or establishment of a U.S.-based, JPO-like organization to facilitate integration/coordination among the multiple CONUS and OCONUS Iraq FMS stakeholders, and to provide day-to-day support for the current OSD FMS Task Force, may have merit.
- (U) Secretary of Defense, with appropriate congressional approval, establish a Defense Coalition Support Account to acquire a pool of critically needed equipment that will be immediately available for shipment to ISF to expand forces, modernize forces, and replace combat losses.
- (U) MNF-I establish and approve authorized positions for its security assistance office in the MNSTC-I Joint Manning Document office that provides sufficient personnel with the requisite skills and experience levels successfully execute its security assistance mission.

MNF-I RESPONSE: Concur.

(U) MNSTC-I J1, with support from MNF-I C1, worked extensively with CCJ1 to add 18 positions to the MNSTC-I JMD. These positions were approved in November 2007. Total manning of the security assistance office is currently at approximately 90%;

however, officers who have had any FMS experience prior to being assigned to MNSTC-I continue to be a challenge. The Joint Staff J5 continues to be a strong advocate and provides invaluable assistance in identifying the correct personnel to fill these positions.

(U) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and US CENTCOM expedite: approval of the MNSTC-I Joint Manning Document; a request for the necessary funding; and assignment of personnel with the requisite skills, experience levels, and rank to fill positions designated in the Joint Manning Document.

CENTCOM RESPONSE: Concur.

(U) The additional JMD positions for the MNSTC-I Security Assistance Office were forwarded to the Joint Staff on 27 August 2007, and approved by SECDEF on 5 November 2007. The military services are working to fill these new positions with personnel possessing requisite skills and experience levels.

MNF-I GENERAL COMMENT:

- (U) The requested additional positions were approved effective November 2007. The optimal manning solution would be assigning personnel with significant FMS experience to no less than 25% of all SAO positions and 100% of all 0-6 positions. Notable efforts have been made to improve the assignment of personnel with FMS experience.
- (U) MNSTC-I advise and assist MoD and MoI in establishing a requirements planning process that forecasts the ISF equipment and training needs on a multi-year basis to stabilize and improve the responsiveness of the Iraqi FMS program.

MNF-I RESPONSE: Concur.

(U) MNSTC-I will continue to work with both MoD and MoI to refine their processes for identifying, prioritizing and resourcing requirements.

Part V – Iraq Security Forces Logistics Capabilities: Observations and Recommendations (U)

(U) Observation N.

(U) The ISF logistics system was in the early stages of development; the system is fragile and currently is not capable of sustaining most independent ISF military operations. MNSTC-I and MNC-I do not have sufficient personnel with the requisite skills and experience levels to carry out its logistics mentoring mission and assist ISF in establishing its logistical sustainment base, which is a U.S. and Iraqi strategic priority.

(U) The expeditious approval of the proposed MNSTC-I Joint Manning Document and the assignment of personnel with the requisite skills, experience levels, and rank to fill positions for the logistics mentoring functions will greatly enhance ISF to become self sufficient and take over more and more battle space; which will greatly reduce the demands on Coalition forces.

(U) Recommendations for Observation N.

- (U) Secretary of Defense appoint a DoD Executive Agent to expedite support to USCENTCOM, MNF-I and MNSTC-I to advise and assist MOD and MOI in planning and building their logistics sustainment base for the Iraq Security Forces.
- (U) Establish and approve authorized positions for senior logistics mentors and military and police transition team logistics mentors in the MNC-I and MNSTC-I Joint Manning Documents that provide for sufficient personnel with the requisite skills and experience levels to successfully execute the logistics mentoring mission.


MNF-I RESPONSE: Concur with comment.

- (U) MNSTC-I to determine requirements for logistics mentors needed for the MNC-I and MNSTC-I staffs, and coordinate with MNF-I C1 to ensure requisite skills and experience levels are incorporated in the Joint Manning Documents. Note that logistics mentors for MiTTs are not sourced through Joint Manning Documents. Requirements are submitted as a Request for Forces (RFF), through the Global Force Management process.
- (U) Ensure that senior logistics mentors and military transition team logistics mentors in the Joint Manning Documents are assigned to MOD, MOI, the Iraqi Joint Headquarters, and ISF as needed.

MNF-I RESPONSE: Concur with comment.

- (U) MNSTC-I to determine requirements for logistics mentors needed for the MNC-I and MNSTC-I staffs, and coordinate with MNF-I C1 to ensure requisite skills and experience levels are incorporated in the Joint Manning Documents. Note that logistics mentors for MiTTs are not sourced through Joint Manning Documents. Requirements are submitted as a Request for Forces (RFF), through the Global Force Management process.
- (U) Establish a logistics training program in Iraq, comparable to that currently provided by the Counter-Insurgency Academy, to train U.S. military and police transition team logistics mentors.

MNF-I RESPONSE: Nonconcur.



CENTCOM RESPONSE: Concur with comment.

(U) USCENTCOM will review and validate future requirements for logistics mentors approved by Commander, MNF-I for addition to MNC-I and MNSTC-I Joint Manning Documents. However, logistics mentors within MiTTs are not sourced through Joint Manning Documents. Requirements are submitted as a Request for Forces (RFF), through the Global Force Management (GFM) process.





SECRETARY OF THE ARMY WASHINGTON

JUN 0 3 2008

MEMORANDUM FOR INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Responses to Department of Defense Inspector General (DoDIG) Draft Report D2007-D000IG-0239.000

- 1. In accordance with the memorandum, DoDIG, March 18, 2008, subject: Inspector General Draft Report D2007-D000IG-0239.000.
- 2. The U.S. Army appreciates the opportunity to comment on the subject report. While the majority of the issues are focused on the U.S. Central Command, the Multi-National Force-Iraq, and the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq, several observations and recommendations have U.S. Army equities. Comments and recommendations applicable to the U.S. Army are addressed at enclosure.

Encl

Pete Geren


Department of Defense Inspector General (DoDIG) DRAFT REPORT ON THE ASSESSMENT OF THE ACCOUNTABILITY OF MUNITIONS PROVIDED TO THE SECURITY FORCES OF IRAQ

PROJECT NUMBER D2007-D000IG-0239.000

Observation H2: Executive Summary, page vii and page 27: "Recommend that the Commander U.S. Army Materiel Command Logistics Support Agency (LOGSA) assist the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) with installing data input quality controls in its centralized database of weapons serial numbers to ensure system compatibility."


U.S. Army Response: The U.S. Army concurs. Over the past two years, the LOGSA Soldier Support Center has been working with MNSTC-I to build MNSTC-I serial number files for weapons transferred to Iraq. A LOGSA representative reviewed and made recommendations on the MNSTC-I reporting requirements in March 2008. LOGSA offered follow-on assistance, to include assistance with the database build. LOGSA reviewed the MNSTC-I draft Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and forwarded its recommendations on the weapons portion of the SOPs. LOGSA continues to assist MNSTC-I.

Observation M, Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Performance, page 40: "At the time of this assessment, the FMS program has not yet demonstrated that it can responsively meet the urgent need to build and sustain Iraq's security forces."




Observation M, Iraqi FMS Issues and Opportunities, Joint Program Management Office, page 42: "The disparate elements in the long FMS organizational processing chain, including elements dealing with export control (such as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Defense Exports and Cooperation (DASA(DE&C)) and program oversight (Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA)), could be co-located in a Joint Program Office (JPO)."


(FACE)



Observation M, Iraqi FMS Issues and Opportunities, Planning Cases, page 42: "The use of Price and Availability (P&A) cases (planning cases) could improve the efficiency and responsiveness of the Iraqi FMS program by projecting multi-year planning assumptions."



Recommendation M.1.b., page 43: "Establish a U.S.-based Joint Program Management Office (JPMO) to implement integration and coordination of the Iraqi FMS program, increase the responsiveness of the support effort, and meet the Wartime requirements of U.S. commanders and the Iraq Security Forces. It is critical that the JPMO be established now."



Recommendation M.3., page 43: "We recommend that the Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq establish and approve authorized positions for its security assistance office in the MNSTC-I Joint Manning Document office that provides sufficient personnel with the requisite skills and experience levels to successfully execute its security assistance mission."

U.S. Army Response: The U.S. Army concurs. The lack of trained and experienced FMS personnel has severely hindered DoD's ability to accelerate delivery of defense articles to Iraq Security Forces. This Inexperience often results in poorly prepared Letters of Request (LORs) containing poorly defined requirements which results in protracted FMS processing times. A detailed requirements document is one of the most important elements of the FMS process.

Since February 2006, the U.S. Army Security Assistance Command (USASAC) has deployed an active duty colonel with extensive experience in tactical and operational logistics planning and a civilian employee on six-month assignments. Although they were initially assigned as liaisons to MNSTC-I, they are currently embedded with MNSTC-I's Security Assistance Office (SAO), headed by Major General George Smith. The U.S. Army also has a call-out for three volunteers with substantial experience in international acquisition and Security Cooperation.

The DoD can increase MNSTC-I's FMS experience factor by cross-leveling experienced personnel between Combatant Commands (COCOMs). Accordingly, I recommend the Joint Staff review SAO (or equivalent organizations') manning levels across all COCOMs and move people as required. While this will not be popular, it is needed.

Appendix F. Organizations Supporting the Train and Equip Mission (U)

- (U) Government of Iraq Organizations. 18
- (U) Iraqi Ministry of Defense. Ministry of Defense (MoD) forces are composed of the Joint Headquarters-Command and Control (responsible for the operational command and control of all Iraqi military forces except special operations forces), the Iraqi Ground Forces Command (Army), the Iraqi Navy, the Iraqi Air Force, and the Iraqi Training and Doctrine Command.
- (U) Iraqi Ministry of Interior. Ministry of Interior (MoI) forces are composed of the Iraqi Police Service (local police), the National Police (a nationally deployable force), the Directorate of Border Enforcement, the Directorate of Ports of Entry, the National Information and Investigation Agency, and other smaller forces. MoI also continues to consolidate the Facilities Protection Services that were assigned to the various ministries within the Government of Iraq.
- (U) Iraq Security Forces. Iraq Security Forces (ISF) are composed of three components: the forces assigned ¹⁹ to MoD, which the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) estimated to have assigned more than 326,000 Service members; the forces assigned to MoI, which the MNF-Iraq estimated to have assigned more than 161,000 civilian security personnel; and the forces assigned to the Counter-Terrorism Bureau (special operations forces), which MNF-I estimated to have assigned more than 3,000 Service members.

(U) DoD Organizations in Southwest Asia.

- (U) U.S. Central Command. The U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) is one of the combatant commands and is headquartered at MacDill Air Force Base, Tampa, Florida. Its area of responsibility includes 27 nations that stretch from the Horn of Africa, throughout the Arabian Gulf Region, into Central Asia. USCENTCOM established MNF-I and the Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) on May 15, 2004, to replace Combined Joint Task Force 7 and assume responsibility for conducting military operations in Iraq.
- (U) Multi-National Force-Iraq. MNF-I is headquartered at Camp Victory, Baghdad, Iraq, with the mission to create a secure environment in Iraq. MNF-I concurrently conducts stability operations to support the Government of Iraq, which will help restore essential services and develop the economy.
- (U) Multi-National Corps-Iraq. MNC-I is a subordinate command of MNF-I and is headquartered at Camp Victory, Baghdad, Iraq. MNC-I is the

¹⁸ (U) The information concerning Government of Iraq organizations was obtained from a DoD report made to Congress, "Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq," December 14, 2007.

¹⁹ (U) The definition of assigned is derived from monthly payroll data for both MoD and MoI forces and includes all personnel, trained and untrained (ministry staffs are not included), who received pay the previous month but do not reflect present for duty totals.

tactical unit responsible for command and control of combat operations by Coalition forces throughout Iraq and its primary mission is to conduct counterinsurgency, stability, and support operations.

- (U) Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq. The Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) is headquartered in the International Zone, Baghdad, Iraq, and is a subordinate command of MNF-I. MNSTC-I manages the use of Iraq Security Forces Fund funds in Iraq.
- (U) The primary mission of MNSTC-I is to assist the Government of Iraq in developing, organizing, training, equipping, and sustaining ISF. This mission was previously performed by three components of MNSTC-I. The Coalition Military Assistance Training Team organized, trained, equipped, and mentored the Iraq Armed Forces. The Civilian Police Assistance Training Team organized, trained, equipped, and mentored the Iraq Civilian Police Forces and other components of MoI. The Joint Headquarters Advisory Support Team assisted the Joint Headquarters of the Iraq Armed Forces in developing a command and control system.
- (U) As of January 6, 2008, MNSTC-I reorganized itself into the following components. The MNSTC-I headquarters includes the Primary and Special Staff and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission. MNSTC-I provides assistance and mentoring using training and transition teams.
 - Civilian Police Assistance Training Team
 - Coalition Air Force Transition Team
 - Coalition Army Advisory Training Team
 - Intelligence Transition Team
 - Iraqi National Counter-Terrorism Task Force Transition Team
 - Joint Headquarters Transition Team
 - Maritime Strategic Transition Team
 - Ministry of Defense Transition Team
 - Ministry of Interior Transition Team
- (U) Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan. The Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan is headquartered in the International Zone, Baghdad, Iraq, and is a subordinate command of MNF-I. The Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan provides guidance policies and procedures governing contracting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Secretary of the Army delegated the Commander, Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan to be the Executive Agent and Head of Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Appendix G. Arms and Ammunition (U)

(U) The scope of our assessment applied to the accountability and control of U.S.-purchased and otherwise obtained arms and ammunition that were under DoD control before DoD formal handover to the Iraq Security Forces. It also applied to the accountability of arms and ammunition under control of the Iraq Security Forces after DoD formal handover to them, regardless of how those arms and ammunition were procured or obtained.

Means to obtain arms and ammunition for Iraq include:

- (U) Arms and ammunition may be funded by:
 - U.S. appropriated funds such as Defense Appropriation Acts, the Iraq Security Forces Fund, and the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund
 - Iraqi national funds that flow through the security assistance process such as Foreign Military Sales programs
- (U) Arms and ammunition may be obtained physically through:
 - Existing DoD stock
 - Capturing, seizing, and donating
 - Private security firms turn-ins
- (U) Arms and ammunition may be purchased from:
 - U.S. manufacturers
 - Foreign manufacturers
 - Arms dealers or middlemen merchants

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Appendix H. United States Code and DoD Policies (U)

- (U) United States Code (U.S.C.) requires accountability and control over U.S. Government property. DoD policies that apply to the accountability and control and the physical security of property to include arms and ammunition that implement the U.S.C. are outlined in this appendix. In addition, DoD policy governing the management of security assistance is also discussed.
- (U) Title 40 United State Code. Title 40 U.S.C., section 524 states:
 - (a) Required. - Each executive agency shall -
 - (1) maintain adequate inventory controls and accountability systems for property under its control
- (U) DoD Instruction 5000.64, "Accountability and Management of DoD-Owned Equipment and Other Accountable Property," November 2, 2006. DoDI 5000.64 provides policy and procedures for DoD-owned equipment and other accountable property and establishes policy and procedures to comply with 40 U.S.C. § 524. DoDI 5000.64 requires that accountable property records shall be established for all property purchased, or otherwise obtained, that are sensitive as defined in DoD 4100.39-M, "Federal Logistics Information System," Volume 10, Table 61, November 2007.
- (U) DoD Instruction 5100.76, "Safeguarding Conventional Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives (AA&E) and the AA&E Physical Security Review Board," October 8, 2005. DoDI 5100.76 and related guidance cited in those Instructions apply to the accountability and control of AA&E and other designated sensitive items provided to ISF. DoDI 5100.76 outlines the authorities, responsibilities, and functions relative to worldwide uniform policy, standards, and guidance for the physical security of conventional arms, ammunition, and explosives in the possession or custody of the DoD Components.
- (U) DoD 5105.38-M, "Security Assistance Management Manual," October 3, 2003. DoD 5105.38-M provides guidance for the administration and implementation of Security Assistance²¹ and related activities in compliance with the Foreign Assistance Act, the Arms Export Control Act, and related statutes and directives.

DoD 5105.38-M states that "title to FMS materiel normally transfers from the USG [U.S. Government] to the purchaser immediately upon its release from a DoD supply activity 22 (point of origin). However, USG security responsibility does not cease until the recipient Government's or international organization's

²⁰ Sensitive items as defined by DoD 4100.39-M is shown in Appendix C.

²¹ Security Assistance is defined in Appendix C.

²² DoD 5105.38-M states a supply activity can be either a DoD storage depot or a commercial vendor that furnishes materiel under a DoD-administered contract.

Designated Government Representative (DRG) assumes final control of the

consignment."

(U) DoD 5105.38-M also states that DoD 5100.76-M defines sensitive AA&E and outlines mandatory procedures for handling, storing, protecting, securing, and transporting it. The AA&E procedures in DoD 5100.76-M also apply to FMS transfers. Sensitive AA&E are items such as small arms²³ weapons, various types of ammunition, explosives, and special items, such as night vision sights and goggles that pose a special danger to the public if they fall into the wrong hands.

²³ Small arms are defined in Appendix C.

Appendix I. Report Distribution (U)

(U) Department of State

Secretary of State U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs Inspector General, Department of State

(U) Office of the Secretary of Defense

Secretary of Defense* Deputy Secretary of Defense* Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff* Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics* Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer Deputy Chief Financial Officer Deputy Comptroller (Program/Budget) Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence* Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff* Assistant Secretary of Defense (Legislative Affairs) Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation Director, Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy Director, Joint Staff Director, Operations (J-3) Director, Strategic Plans and Policy (J-5)

(U) Department of the Army

Secretary of the Army*
Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology
Commander, U.S. Army Materiel Command*
Executive Director for Conventional Ammunition
Commander, U.S. Army Joint Arms and Ammunition Command
Commander, U.S. Army Materiel Command Logistics Support Activity
Commander, U.S. Army Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command
Commander, U.S. Army Security Assistance Command
Commander, U.S. Army TACOM and Life Cycle Management Command
Commander/Chief of Engineers, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
Commander, Gulf Region Division, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
Auditor General, Department of the Army
Inspector General of the Army

^{*}Recipient of the draft report

(U) Department of the Navy

Naval Inspector General Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (International Programs)

(U) Department of the Air Force

Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management and Comptroller) Commander, Air Force Security Assistance Center Inspector General of the Air Force

(U) Combatant Commands

Commander, U.S. Central Command*
Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq*
Commander, Multi-National Corps-Iraq*
Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq*
Commander, Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan*
Commander, U.S. Transportation Command
U.S. Air Force Air Mobility Command

(U) Other Defense Organizations

Director, Defense Contract Audit Agency
Director, Defense Logistics Agency
Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency*
The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction

(U) Other Non-Defense Federal Organizations

Comptroller of the United States Office of Management and Budget

^{*}Recipient of the draft report

(U) Congressional Committees and Subcommittees, Chairman and Ranking Minority Member

Senate Committee on Appropriations

Senate Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations

Senate Committee on Armed Services

Senate Committee on Foreign Relations

Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

House Committee on Appropriations

House Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations

House Committee on Armed Services

House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

House Subcommittee on Government Management, Organization, and Procurement


House Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs

House Committee on International Relations

Team Members (U)

The DoD OIG Assessment Team on Arms and Ammunition Accountability prepared this report. Members of the team include:

Claude M. Kicklighter, Inspector General Thomas F. Gimble, Principal Deputy Inspector General Kenneth P. Moorefield, Assistant Inspector General



U.S. Central Command Team Member

U.S. Army Audit Agency Team Member

U.S. Army Criminal Investigative Division Team Member

U.S. Air Force National Guard Judge Advocate General Corps Team Member

Department of State, Office of the Inspector General Team Member

Department of Justice, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives

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Send written complaints to: Defense Hotline, The Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-1900 Phone: 800.424.9098 e-mail: https://doi.org/10.2030/journal/bentagon/ www.dodig.mil/hotline



Inspector General
Department of Defense

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